Mobile crusher safety comes down to three moments: where the plant is set up, how it is moved, and whether its lanyard emergency stops actually work. A track mounted crusher or screen is fixed plant that gets rebuilt on new ground every few weeks, often by a contract crew, and every relocation is a chance for the ground, the layout or the stop circuit to be wrong. The NSW Resources Regulator has recently found lanyard stop circuits bypassed on operating plant while the pre-start said they worked.

This guide covers what that regulator bulletin found, the legal duties behind it, how to plan a set-up and a relocation, how to prove a lanyard system is live rather than assume it, and what to put on a mobile crushing plant pre-start and relocation checklist.

Why a mobile crushing plant is a different risk

A fixed crushing circuit is designed once, guarded once and inspected against a layout that does not change. A mobile crushing plant carries the same energy, the same nip points and the same blockage hazards, but its layout is rebuilt every time it moves. The feed position, the conveyor discharge points, the stockpiles, the loader’s path and the ground under the tracks are all new.

Three things make it harder to manage. The plant is often owned and run by a contractor, so the quarry’s own systems may not reach it. It switches between a travel configuration and an operating configuration, and the safety systems behave differently in each. And because it moves, the site map and the exclusion areas drawn last month are often wrong this month. These sit alongside the wider plant hazards in our guide to quarry hazards and the controls that matter.

What NSW Safety Bulletin SB25-07 found

In December 2025 the NSW Resources Regulator published Safety Bulletin SB25-07, Bypassing lanyard safety systems on mobile crushing and screening equipment. It reports repeated site visits where mobile crushing and screening equipment was operating with the lanyard emergency stop circuit bypassed by a travel plug or a travel mode switch.

The pattern across the four scenarios in the bulletin is uncomfortable reading:

• Visual checks did not find it. In every case the bypass was only identified after the Regulator asked for a live test of the lanyard system. A visual inspection alone would have suggested the system worked.
• The pre-starts said the lanyards worked. Pre-start records showed the lanyards as operational, which is not possible with the plant in travel mode.
• The push buttons still worked. Fixed emergency stop buttons continued to function in travel mode, which gave a false sense that the stop system was intact.
• Nobody could identify the plugs. In some cases the travel and operational plugs were unlabelled, and on one site nobody could say which plug was which.
• The bypass hid a fault. In three of the four scenarios, switching back to the operational plug or mode stopped the plant from starting: a faulty lanyard circuit, a broken wire in the circuit, and a faulty lanyard that was difficult to reset. In that last case a worker admitted knowingly starting the machine in travel mode to get around the fault.

The scenarios involved one contractor running two trains and three owner operators, and one of the screens was new. The lesson is not about one crew. It is that a travel mode designed to let the plant track can quietly become the way the plant runs.

The legal duties behind it

SB25-07 points to the general plant duties in the NSW Work Health and Safety Regulation 2025, which replaced the 2017 Regulation in August 2025. The bulletin relies on three provisions:

• Section 37, maintenance of control measures. A duty holder who implements a control measure must ensure it is, and remains, effective: fit for purpose, suitable for the nature and duration of the work, and installed, set up and used correctly.
• Section 205, preventing unauthorised alterations to or interference with plant. The person with management or control of plant must, so far as is reasonably practicable, prevent unauthorised alteration or interference. The bulletin reads this as covering lanyards, emergency stops and interlocks being bypassed, whether intentionally or not.
• Section 206, proper use of plant and controls. The person with management or control of plant must take all reasonable steps to ensure health and safety features and warning devices, including guarding, operational controls and emergency stops, are used in accordance with the instructions and information that person provides. The bulletin says this includes not operating plant in a travel or bypass mode that disables a safety function.

Section 213 of the same Regulation also requires maintenance, inspection and, where necessary, testing of plant to be done by a competent person, following the manufacturer’s recommendations or, where there are none, a competent person’s. That is where the lanyard circuit belongs on the service sheet.

For NSW mines and quarries, the Work Health and Safety (Mines and Petroleum Sites) Regulation 2022 adds mine-specific duties. Section 46 requires the mine operator to ensure belt conveyors are fitted with an emergency stop system and regularly inspected by a competent person, and section 26 deals with a contractor’s health and safety management plan, reviewed by the operator, or the contractor working under the mine’s own system.

The bulletin itself is safety advice, not law, and it is written for the NSW mining industry. In Queensland the same failure sits squarely inside the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017. Sections 6 to 9 require hazards to be identified, risks analysed and controlled in the hierarchy order, and risk monitored, including when the mine’s risk management practices or procedures change significantly. Sections 108 and 109 cover monitoring and maintenance of plant. A quarry is a mine under the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999, so a contract crushing train on a Queensland quarry falls within the site’s safety and health management system.

Planning the set-up

Most mobile plant problems are cheaper to solve before the tracks move. A set-up plan for each new location, agreed between the crushing crew and the quarry, should answer a short list of questions.

Ground and level

Is the pad compacted, drained and level enough for the manufacturer’s operating limits? Fill, old stockpile footprints and wet ground can settle under a loaded crusher and throw conveyors out of alignment. Check the manufacturer’s limits for slope while operating and while tracking, and keep the plant well back from batter crests and the toe of stockpiles.

Layout and interaction with mobile plant

Where does the loader feed from, and where does it turn? Where do the trucks queue and load out? Conveyor discharge points create stockpiles that grow towards travel paths. Lay the train out so that loaders and pedestrians do not share the same ground, and so that a person walking to a lanyard or a control panel does not cross a loader’s path.

Overhead and underground services

Raised conveyors and folding sections change height between travel and operation. Check overhead power lines along the tracking route and at the operating position, and confirm nothing buried sits under the pad or the tracking route.

Exclusion areas and access

Define the exclusion area around the feed, the crushing chamber and every discharge point, and mark the safe walkways to control panels and lanyard points. Plan where people stand for blockage clearing, which belongs in its own procedure: see clearing crusher blockages without exposure to stored energy.

Relocation and tracking

Tracking is when the plant is least stable and people are most likely to be close to it. Treat each move as a planned task, not a quick repositioning.

• Walk the route first. Check the ground, the grades, the cross slopes, soft spots, windrows, services and anything overhead.
• Clear the zone. Set an exclusion area around the moving plant and stop other mobile plant from entering it. Nobody stands between the machine and anything it could pin them against.
• Fold and secure. Conveyors folded and pinned, hoppers and screens in the travel position, and loose material cleared so it cannot fall during the move.
• Control the operator’s position. With a remote or tethered controller, the operator must be able to see the full path and stay clear of the tracks. Use a spotter where the view is restricted.
• Change back on purpose. When the plant arrives, the switch from travel to operating configuration is a defined step with a sign-off, not something done by habit.

The final step is where SB25-07 bites. The travel plug or travel mode switch is there for moving the plant, and in every case in the bulletin it left the lanyard circuit bypassed. If nothing forces the change back, the plant can start crushing in travel mode and run that way for weeks.

Making lanyard emergency stops real

A lanyard emergency stop is the control a worker reaches for when someone is being drawn into a conveyor. It has to work every time, and the only way to know it works is to pull it. The bulletin’s recommendations (inspect for bypasses, live test, educate the crew, put travel mode and lanyards on the pre-start, put lanyard circuits on the service sheet), with some practical additions, look like this on site:

1. Label the plugs and switches. Travel and operational plugs, and the mode switch positions, clearly and permanently marked so anyone on the crew can tell which is fitted.
2. Make the mode visible. The operator and the supervisor should be able to confirm the operating mode from the control position before start-up.
3. Live test, not look. Pull each lanyard and confirm the plant stops, at a frequency the site sets and after every relocation, repair or lanyard adjustment.
4. Put travel mode on the pre-start. An explicit question: is the operational plug fitted or the switch in operating mode? A lanyard question that can be ticked while in travel mode is not a check.
5. Put the lanyard circuit on the service sheet. Maintenance inspections should cover the full circuit, wire tension, switches and reset function.
6. Treat a fault as a stop. A lanyard that will not reset is a reason not to start, never a reason to use travel mode. Workers need to hear that from supervisors, and need a fast route to a fitter so the fault gets fixed.
7. Train the crew. Everyone, including contractors and relief operators, should know what travel mode disables and how to identify the plugs.

Lanyard stops are not guarding. They act after someone is already in trouble. Fixed guards on tail drums, head pulleys and return idlers on the plant’s conveyors still need to be in place, and our guide to conveyor guarding at a quarry covers why guards come off and how to keep them on. Isolation for maintenance follows the same rules as fixed plant, set out in isolation and lockout for quarry plant.

Contract crushing crews

Contract crushing is common, and it splits responsibility in a way that suits shortcuts. The crew knows its plant; the quarry knows its ground, traffic and emergency arrangements. Both hold duties for the same plant at the same time.

Before the plant arrives, agree whose procedures govern set-up, relocation, isolation and pre-starts, and how the quarry will see the results. Ask for the plant’s lanyard test records and maintenance history. Include the crushing train in the site’s inspections rather than leaving it as the contractor’s island. The wider framework is in our guide to contractor management at a quarry.

Mobile crushing plant pre-start and relocation checklist

How this gets managed day to day

The SB25-07 cases share a records problem as much as a hardware one: pre-starts said the lanyards worked, and nobody could tell from the paperwork that they did not. And because a mobile train moves, the quarry’s picture of where the plant sits and where the exclusion areas are drifts out of date.

HazView suits quarries as well as open cut coal and metalliferous mines. The plant location and its exclusion areas are drawn on one interactive site map that every role uses, and are updated when the train moves rather than left on a whiteboard. Pre-start and relocation checklists are built to the site’s own form and can be completed fully offline at the plant, with photos on any question. Conditional logic means a “travel mode fitted” or “lanyard failed” answer opens a follow-up section rather than ending the form, a supervisor can countersign by role, and a faulty lanyard can be raised as a hazard with a control, an accountable owner and a due date. Workers can see how this looks from the field on the HazView page for every worker, or book a demo to walk through a relocation checklist.

Frequently asked questions

What is a travel plug on a mobile crusher?

A travel plug, or a travel mode switch, puts the plant’s control circuit into its travel configuration for moving the plant. In the cases NSW Safety Bulletin SB25-07 describes, travel mode bypassed the lanyard stop circuit while the fixed push button stops still worked. The bulletin reports plant found crushing and screening with the travel plug still fitted, so the lanyards would not have stopped it.

How should lanyard emergency stops be tested?

By pulling them and confirming the plant stops. SB25-07 found that visual inspection would have suggested the systems were working in every case it described. Set a live test frequency in the site’s procedures and repeat it after each relocation, repair or adjustment.

Does SB25-07 apply outside NSW?

The bulletin is safety advice for the NSW mining industry, not law, and the provisions it cites are in the NSW Work Health and Safety Regulation 2025. The hazard is the same anywhere the plant runs. In Queensland, managing it falls under the risk management and plant maintenance duties in the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017.

Who is responsible for a contractor’s mobile crushing plant?

More than one party. The contractor manages its plant, and the quarry operator holds duties for everything on its site. Agree in writing whose procedures apply, share the inspection and test records, and include the crushing train in the site’s own inspections.

What should a mobile screening plant pre-start include?

Beyond the usual fluids, tracks and guarding checks, a mobile screening plant pre-start should confirm the operating mode, that each lanyard is tensioned and undamaged, that guards are in place on every conveyor, and that exclusion areas and walkways are set out. A lanyard question that can be ticked while the plant is in travel mode is not doing its job.

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Quarry supervisor duties in Queensland are set by law, not by a position description. The Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 defines a supervisor as a person appointed to implement and monitor the safety and health management system and to direct other workers under it, and since 1 September 2024 the Regulation has listed the supervisor’s own responsibilities: supervising and observing workers, inspecting workplaces, recording what the inspections find, and implementing and monitoring hazard and risk controls.

This guide sets out what the Act and the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017 require, where guidance note QGN 14 fits and where it has dated, and how span of control, shift handover and competence work at a quarry.

Why the supervisor is where the system succeeds or fails

A safety and health management system is written in an office and lived on the bench, at the crusher and on the haul road. The supervisor connects the two; stretch the supervisor too thin and they drift apart.

The law recognises this. Section 39(1)(h) of the Act requires the site senior executive to provide for adequate supervision and control of operations on each shift at the mine, appropriate inspection of each workplace including pre-shift inspections where necessary, and adequate supervision and monitoring of contractors. A quarry is a mine under the Act, so all of that applies.

QGN 14 came out of a 2006 coronial inquest at a Queensland metalliferous mine, where the coroner asked how meaningful supervision can be delivered to skilled, autonomous workers spread across a site. That describes most quarries: small crews, long distances between face and plant, and contractors expected to look after themselves.

What the law says a supervisor is

Under section 23 of the MQSHA, a supervisor at a mine is a person appointed under section 51 to implement and monitor the mine’s safety and health management system, and to give directions to other mine workers in accordance with that system. Both halves matter: a leading hand who directs a crew but never monitors the system is doing only half the job the Act describes.

Section 51 controls the appointment. The site senior executive must not appoint a person as a supervisor unless the person is competent to be a supervisor and, if the Mining Safety and Health Advisory Committee has recognised a safety and health competency for supervisors, holds it. Competence is itself defined in section 13 as the demonstrated skill and knowledge to carry out the task to the standard necessary for the safety and health of persons.

Three more provisions shape the role around the person:

• Management structure. Section 50 requires the SSE to develop, maintain and document a management structure for the mine, and section 50(2)(e) requires that document to provide for a competent person to perform a supervisor’s duties while the supervisor is absent.
• Personal obligation. Section 36A(2)(b) requires every worker and other person at a mine to ensure, to the extent of the responsibilities and duties allocated to them, that risk is managed to an acceptable level in the work and activities under their control, supervision or leadership. A supervisor carries that obligation personally.
• Withdrawal. Under section 252, a worker who cannot eliminate an unacceptable danger must immediately report it to their supervisor, and where workers must withdraw, the supervisor must ensure they are withdrawn from the mine or the affected area.

For the SSE who appoints and resources the supervisor, see the site senior executive at a Queensland quarry.

The supervisor’s responsibilities under the Regulation

Section 95A of the MQSHR 2017, inserted by the Resources Safety and Health Legislation Amendment Regulation 2024 from 1 September 2024, reads: “A supervisor for a mine has the following responsibilities”:

1. ensuring each worker for whom the supervisor has responsibilities is given the supervision and help mentioned in sections 95(2) and 96;
2. observing each worker for whom the supervisor has responsibilities perform tasks;
3. carrying out inspections of workplaces at the mine as required under the mine’s safety and health management system;
4. recording reports of, and findings and recommendations resulting from, inspections mentioned in paragraph (c) in the mine record;
5. implementing and monitoring hazard controls and risk controls as required under the mine’s safety and health management system.

Read that list as things an inspector can ask to see. Work that leaves no record is hard to prove.

The SSE’s side of the same coin

The Regulation also tells the SSE what supervision must achieve. Section 95(2) requires each worker to be given the supervision, and help from other competent persons, necessary to achieve an acceptable level of risk. Section 96(1) requires supervision to the extent necessary to ensure each worker is not likely to be exposed to conditions beyond their capabilities, has the resources to work without unacceptable risk, works within their fitness and competence, and complies with their safety and health obligations.

Section 96(2) is the one that shapes a supervisor’s day: the supervision must include communication, including direct contact, at appropriate intervals by the worker’s supervisor. On a plain reading, a radio call is communication; direct contact means turning up.

Two more duties that land on supervisors

• Entering a workplace (s 99). Each supervisor for a workplace must ensure a person does not enter it unless the supervisor reasonably believes the person can respond appropriately to its normal activities and to any likely incident or emergency.
• Trainees (s 93(4)). The SSE must ensure a person being trained or assessed does not work unless adequately supervised, and that supervision usually falls to the supervisor.

Where QGN 14 fits, and where it has dated

QGN 14 Effective safety and health supervision is dated November 2008, was issued under the MQSHA and is still listed among the guidance notes on the Queensland register of recognised standards, guidelines and guidance notes. It is guidance, not law, and says so itself: it is neither a guideline as defined in the MQSHA nor a recognised standard as defined in the coal mining Act, it does not prevent other ways of achieving an acceptable level of risk, and complying with it may not be enough to comply with the legislation.

Read it with its date in mind. QGN 14 quotes the repealed 2001 Regulation and the old section 23, under which a supervisor was simply a worker authorised by the SSE to give directions, and the old section 51, which spoke of assigning a supervisor’s tasks. The Resources Safety and Health Legislation Amendment Act 2024 replaced both sections from 1 September 2024, the same day section 95A entered the Regulation. Quote obligations from the current Act and Regulation, not from the note.

What it is still good at:

• Supervision belongs in the system. It is a management function to reflect in the SHMS and the organisational structure, with a clear, realistic position description for each supervisor.
• Closeness follows risk. The closeness of direct supervision should reflect the risk workers face and their skill and experience, which the note calls critical where procedures are the main control, because a missed step means exposure to an uncontrolled hazard.
• Contractors are supervised too. Company and contractor supervision should be defined in the contract, and contractor self-supervision reflected in the SSE’s management structure.
• A self-assessment. Appendix C is a questionnaire for anyone with supervisory responsibilities, covering how the role is defined, planned and resourced; Appendix D is the assessor’s guide for scoring it.

Span of control: how many is too many at a quarry?

Neither the Act nor the Regulation sets a ratio. QGN 14 leaves resourcing to each site and lists the points to weigh:

• the number of people reporting to the supervisor;
• the geographical spread of people and activities;
• activities allocated to the supervisor that take them away from supervising; and
• the overall time needed to do the complete supervisor role effectively.

At a quarry the second and third points usually bite first. A supervisor covering the pit, the crushing plant, the weighbridge and a contract drill crew on a distant bench may have only six people and still be unable to make direct contact at appropriate intervals, especially after a stint relieving on the loader.

A defensible approach is to write the span down: for each shift pattern, who the supervisor covers, where they are, which tasks rely on procedures as the main control, and how often the supervisor reaches each area. If that does not fit the hours, the answer is more supervision or less spread. Give night shifts and skeleton crews their own line, and consider fatigue management at a quarry.

Shift handover: passing the site to the next supervisor

QGN 14 lists shift handovers among the documentation a supervisor handles, and the Regulation makes one handover topic explicit: where blasting is carried out, section 70(2)(j) requires the mine’s written blasting procedures to provide for communicating, from one shift to another, information about charging and blasted locations. Everything else that changed on the shift deserves the same.

A useful handover answers a short list of questions, face to face where possible:

• Which areas are closed, restricted or changed, and why?
• Which hazards were found or changed this shift, and what controls are in place?
• Which controls are out of service or awaiting repair, such as a damaged bund or a guard removed for maintenance?
• Where are charged holes, blasted areas and any misfire?
• Which plant is isolated, and who holds the locks?
• What inspections were completed, and what did they find?

The weakest handovers are verbal summaries at the crib room door: the headline survives, the detail does not, and nothing shows the information passed.

Quarry supervisor competencies

The legal test in section 51 is competence to be a supervisor, plus any competency the Mining Safety and Health Advisory Committee has recognised for supervisors. The competencies QGN 14 names date from 2008, and the note itself warns they can be reviewed and changed, so check the current position with Resources Safety and Health Queensland before relying on a course list.

Beyond formal units, QGN 14 describes a competent supervisor as one who communicates clearly, plans and delegates, coaches, solves problems, understands the crew’s strengths and limitations, understands the work, and balances safety against production. Promoting the best operator does not automatically produce that person, so document the competence behind each appointment.

What goes wrong in practice

QGN 14 groups supervisor-related failures into four categories. At a quarry they tend to look like this:

• Inadequate supervision. A new starter is left on a task with a procedure and a radio, and nobody observes them.
• Planned inappropriate actions. A breakdown puts production behind, so the pre-start brief is skipped.
• Failing to correct a known problem. The windrow mentioned at every pre-start is still damaged a month later because it never got an owner.
• Supervisory violations. Inspection forms completed from memory at the end of the shift.

Contractor crews are where these gaps most often open. See contractor management at a quarry, and job safety analysis under QGN 17 for the task-level tool supervisors review most.

Summary: obligation, source and the evidence that shows it

For how supervision fits the wider picture of hazards across a quarry, start at our guide to quarry hazards and controls, and for the state framework as a whole see quarry safety in Queensland.

How Western Australia compares

Queensland defines the supervisor in the Act, tests the appointment on competence and lists the supervisor’s responsibilities in the Regulation. Western Australia prescribes statutory supervisor as a position in its mines regulations, with approved training before appointment. See our guide to the statutory supervisor at a WA quarry.

Making the supervisor’s shift visible

Most of what section 95A asks for already happens at a well-run quarry, but in a notebook, on a radio and in the supervisor’s head, so the mine record shows little of it and the next shift inherits less.

HazView suits quarries as well as coal and metalliferous mines. It puts the supervisor’s shift on one interactive map of the site: hazards drawn, updated and resolved where they are, with photos and full history, and area states showing what is open, restricted or closed. Inspections are built to the site’s own forms and completed in the field, offline if needed, pinned to a location or attached to a hazard, with a PDF record generated on submit. Controls carry an accountable owner, due date and status, so the incoming supervisor sees what is outstanding. Shift reports are generated from the map and inspections in the site’s own format.

See how managers use HazView to see supervision across a site, or book a demo and walk through a supervisor’s shift on your own map.

Frequently asked questions

Is QGN 14 mandatory at a Queensland quarry?

No. QGN 14 is a November 2008 guidance note, not a guideline under the MQSHA. It does not prevent other ways of achieving an acceptable level of risk, and some of the law it quotes has since been replaced. The binding obligations are in the current MQSHA and MQSHR 2017.

What are a quarry supervisor’s duties under the Regulation?

Since 1 September 2024, section 95A of the MQSHR 2017 has made the supervisor responsible for ensuring workers get the supervision and help required, observing them perform tasks, inspecting workplaces as the system requires, recording inspection findings in the mine record, and implementing and monitoring hazard and risk controls.

Is there a maximum number of workers per supervisor?

No fixed ratio is set. Supervision must be enough to meet section 96, including direct contact at appropriate intervals. QGN 14 suggests weighing headcount, spread, competing tasks and the time the full role needs.

Who covers when the supervisor is away?

Section 50(2)(e) of the MQSHA requires the SSE’s documented management structure to provide for a competent person to perform a supervisor’s duties while the supervisor is absent. Name the cover in advance, not on the morning.

The post The Quarry Supervisor in Queensland: QGN 14 and Effective Supervision appeared first on HazView®.

QGL02 respirable dust requirements come from a Queensland guideline made under section 63 of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999, and it applies to every mineral mine and quarry in the state. It is not a regulation or a recognised standard, but it is far from optional: you meet your obligation only by following the way it states or another way that is equal or better. The exposure limits sit in the Regulation: 0.05 mg/m³ for respirable crystalline silica and 5 mg/m³ for general respirable dust.

This guide covers QGL02’s legal weight, the current Queensland limits, the 1 December 2026 national change, how exposure is assessed and sampled, the 28-day reporting step, and the controls that matter around crushers and haul roads.

Why respirable dust deserves its own system at a quarry

Respirable dust is the fraction small enough to reach the deepest parts of the lungs. QGL02 describes it as particles under 10 microns and links elevated exposure to mine dust lung disease: pneumoconiosis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and lung cancer. Silica is particularly harmful when it is freshly fractured by drilling, blasting or crushing, which describes most of what a hard rock quarry does every shift.

The harm is delayed and the dust that matters is invisible: the guideline tells sites to train workers that a lack of visible dust is not a reliable indicator of risk. A hazard you cannot see only gets managed if the system forces it to be.

QGL02 gives typical crystalline silica content of more than 70 per cent for sandstone, 40 to 60 per cent for shale, up to 30 per cent for granite, up to 5 per cent for basalt and dolerite, and up to 2 per cent for limestone and marble. Dust sits alongside noise and heat as a long-term health hazard in our guide to quarry hazards and controls.

What QGL02 is, and the weight it carries

The full title is QGL02 Guideline for management of respirable dust in Queensland mineral mines and quarries. The Queensland register of recognised standards, guidelines and guidance notes lists the current edition as version 4, April 2021. The document states it was issued under Part 5 and section 63(1) of the Act, was gazetted on 14 May 2021, and applies to all Queensland mineral mines and quarries. Version 4 widened the scope from silica to respirable dust in general.

Queensland has three tiers of published material, and they are easy to confuse. Recognised standards are made for coal mines. Guidelines, the QGL series, are made by the Minister under section 63 of the Act for mineral mines and quarries and state ways of achieving an acceptable level of risk. Guidance notes, the QGN series, are issued to help operators meet their obligations and are not mandatory. QGL02 sits in the middle tier.

Three sections of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 set that weight:

• Section 34(3): if a guideline states a way of achieving an acceptable level of risk, you discharge your obligation only by adopting and following a stated way, or another way that achieves a level of risk equal to or better than the acceptable level.
• Section 45: following the guideline’s way, or an equal or better way, is a defence in a prosecution.
• Section 64: a guideline is admissible in evidence where it is claimed a person failed to achieve an acceptable level of risk.

Within the document, “must” and “shall” mark obligations and “should” a recommendation. A quarry that departs from QGL02 needs a written case that its own method is at least as good. Section 147 of the Regulation also requires the site senior executive to keep the current guideline for work at the mine available and easily accessible to the workers doing that work.

The exposure limits Queensland quarries work to

QGL02 does not set a number. It says the occupational exposure limit must be taken from the latest version of Schedule 5 of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017, General exposure limits for hazards. In the version current as at 27 March 2026, Schedule 5 sets:

The Queensland Government’s exposure limits for dust page lists the same three dust figures for mineral mines and quarries. The 1.5 mg/m³ respirable dust figure at the top of that page, repeated in some industry summaries of QGL02, is the coal limit for coal dust under section 89 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2017. It does not appear in the quarry Regulation.

The limits are set against a standard work cycle, which the Regulation defines as a shift of no more than 8 hours a day, no more than five shifts a week and at least 16 hours between shifts. Section 134 requires the limit to be adjusted where a worker’s cycle does not conform to that, and also where heavy, strenuous work or adverse climatic conditions may increase the effect of the hazard. QGL02 Appendix 6 gives worked adjustment factors, for example 0.83 for four 12-hour days on and three off, and 0.71 for 14 days on and seven off at 12 hours. A 12-hour roster therefore works to a lower effective silica limit than the headline 0.05. Section 135 then requires exposure to stay under the limit and as low as reasonably achievable, not just under it.

Does the 1 December 2026 change apply to Queensland mines?

Safe Work Australia’s changes to workplace exposure limits replace the Workplace Exposure Standards list with the Workplace Exposure Limits list from 1 December 2026. Respirable crystalline silica is not among the values that change on that date.

For Queensland mines and quarries, the position is narrower. The silica and dust limits above are written into Schedule 5 itself, so they do not move with the national list. For other contaminants, the Regulation still defines the “airborne contaminants standards” as the Safe Work Australia document called Workplace exposure standards for airborne contaminants. As at 14 October 2026, the Queensland legislation register showed the Regulation as last amended on 27 March 2026, with no amendment adopting the new list and none commencing on 1 December 2026. That can change: check the current version of the Regulation and any Resources Safety and Health Queensland notice rather than assuming the national change carries across, or that it does not.

How QGL02 expects exposure to be assessed

QGL02’s list of dust-generating activities includes drilling, blasting, road making, crushing and screening, load-out, maintenance, and cleaning with dry sweeping or compressed air.

Step 1: the qualitative estimate

The site senior executive must have exposure estimated for each workgroup or similar exposure group (SEG), in consultation with an occupational hygienist. The guideline fixes the criteria: under 10 per cent of the exposure limit is acceptable, 10 to 100 per cent is uncertain, and over 100 per cent is unacceptable. For silica, an estimate below 0.02 mg/m³ may be treated as acceptable. The hazard identification and this qualitative assessment must be reviewed at least every two years.

Step 2: measurement where the estimate is uncertain or worse

An uncertain or unacceptable estimate triggers a quantitative assessment against an exposure assessment plan agreed with the hygienist. The detail that catches sites out:

• Only personal samples from the worker’s breathing zone count. Static samples are not used for the quantitative assessment or periodic monitoring.
• Sampling should cover the full shift, and never less than half of it: at least 6 hours on a 12-hour shift.
• Workers to be sampled should be chosen at random on the day.
• At least six samples are needed for statistical analysis, with a minimum set by group size in the guideline’s Table 2.
• A group’s exposure is acceptable when the 95 per cent upper confidence limit (Land’s UCL95) is below the limit.

Step 3: periodic monitoring

After a quantitative assessment, the hygienist sets a periodic monitoring plan. Table 4 of the guideline sets the minimum frequency from the group’s estimated exposure as a percentage of the limit: one sample per quarter above 100 per cent, two per year at 50 to 100 per cent, one per year at 10 to 49 per cent, and professional judgement below 10 per cent. Section 136 of the Regulation independently requires monitoring and regular analysis wherever exposure could exceed the limit, done in the way any relevant Australian standard states; the Regulation gives AS 2985 as the example for respirable dust.

Who can sample

Respirable dust sampling under AS 2985 is a task prescribed in Schedule 5AA of the Regulation, so it needs a competency recognised by the Mining Safety and Health Advisory Committee. QGL02 expects the hygienist to be a full member of the Australian Institute of Occupational Hygienists or equivalently qualified; a technician can sample under their supervision, and analysis goes to an accredited laboratory.

Exceedances, results and the 28-day notice

QGL02 is specific about what happens after sampling:

• A single sample over the limit triggers an investigation into the cause and the actions to prevent a repeat. The report and corrective actions are communicated to workers and recorded in the mine record.
• Within 28 days of any monitoring, the hygienist gives the site senior executive a written report: AS 2985 compliance, who was sampled, duties, durations, results against the applicable limit, whether respiratory protection was worn, and recommendations.
• Each worker sampled gets their own result as soon as practicable.
• The mines inspectorate is notified within 28 days of the site senior executive becoming aware of the dust sampling results, in the form published by the chief inspector. The register lists that form as the mineral mines and quarries occupational hygiene data template.

Monitoring records for delayed-effect hazards such as dust and silica are kept for 30 years, including exposure results, health surveillance reports and employment records. Respiratory health surveillance is arranged under section 145L of the Regulation, which applies the health surveillance requirements in Schedule 2E, and under QGL04, the companion guideline for mineral mines and quarries. Unless a risk assessment shows the respiratory risk is minimal, the site senior executive must arrange it.

Controls at the crusher, the screens and the roads

QGL02 requires the hierarchy of control, applied as far as reasonably practicable, and puts weight on controls being effective and reliable, not just installed. For each engineered control, the guideline expects a documented owner, objective, performance requirements, maintenance, and the inspection or testing that verifies it.

At a typical quarry, that means:

• Crushing and screening. Water sprays at transfer points, enclosures and skirting, and extraction where fitted. The check needs to cover blocked nozzles, an empty water tank and torn skirts.
• Operator cabins and control rooms. Sealed, pressurised cabs with maintained filters, doors kept shut, and no dry sweeping or air hoses.
• Haul roads and stockpiles. Watering rates matched to traffic and weather, speed limits, and surface material that does not break down into fines. The heat stress guide for quarries covers the same hot, dry days from the worker’s side.
• Respiratory protection. Only where exposure cannot be prevented or reduced by other controls. QGL02 makes fit testing and facial hair rules mandatory where a group’s UCL95 is above the limit, with selection, use and maintenance to AS/NZS 1715.

Workers must be told where the dust hazards are and how controls are checked, at induction, refresher training and after significant change. For the documented controls, the approach in critical controls at Queensland quarries applies directly.

Where dust programs go wrong

• Sampling without a plan. Results arrive, but no SEGs were defined, so there is nothing to analyse statistically and no defensible periodic frequency.
• Exceedance investigations that stop at “worker wore a mask”. The guideline wants the cause and the control fix.
• The 28-day notice missed because the result sat in an inbox.
• Controls nobody owns. The sprays were specified on day one; nobody checks the nozzles.

Noise has the same slow, invisible harm; see our quarry noise and hearing conservation guide.

Keeping dust controls visible day to day

Sampling belongs with the occupational hygienist and the laboratory, and HazView does not measure dust. It helps with the part of QGL02 that lives between sampling rounds: where the dust hazards are, who owns each control, and whether it was checked. HazView suits quarries as well as coal and metalliferous mines. Dust sources such as the primary crusher, screens, transfer points and haul road sections can be drawn as hazards on one interactive map of the site, each with its controls, an accountable owner, a due date and a status. A custom checklist covering sprays, skirts, cab seals and road watering can be pinned to the crusher on the map, completed offline, and carry photos against each question. A failed answer can open a follow-up section. The hazard register exports to CSV or JSON for the hygienist’s review.

See how this works for the people accountable for the safety and health management system in HazView for managers, or book a demo with your own dust control checks.

Summary: QGL02 at a glance

Working in Western Australia? The rules are different: see our guides to silica dust at WA quarries and workplace exposure limits at WA mines.

Frequently asked questions

Is QGL02 mandatory?

Not in the way a regulation is, but close. Under section 34 of the Act you discharge your obligation only by following its stated way or an equal or better one, and it is admissible in evidence in a prosecution. Departing from it needs a documented justification.

What is the silica exposure limit at a Queensland quarry?

0.05 mg/m³, in Schedule 5 of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017, adjusted down for longer or non-standard rosters. Exposure must also be as low as reasonably achievable.

Do the national workplace exposure limits from 1 December 2026 change Queensland quarry limits?

Silica is not among the values changing nationally on that date, and the Queensland silica and dust limits are written into the Regulation. For other contaminants the Regulation still points to the Workplace exposure standards document. As at 14 October 2026 no Queensland amendment had been made, so check the current Regulation and any regulator notice before relying on either list.

Do we have to report dust results to the regulator?

Yes. QGL02 requires the site senior executive to notify the mines inspectorate within 28 days of becoming aware of dust sampling results, in the chief inspector’s form.

The post Respirable Dust and Silica at a Queensland Quarry: QGL02 Explained appeared first on HazView®.

A quarry risk assessment is a structured, team-based review of a task or area that identifies its hazards, rates each risk by likelihood and consequence, decides whether that risk is acceptable, and records the controls that will bring it down, who owns them and by when. Below is a seven-step method, an example 5×5 matrix, a full worksheet you can copy, and a worked example for loading customer road trucks at a stockpile.

It also covers what Queensland law asks of a risk assessment, what it does not, and where quarry risk assessments go wrong.

Why the risk assessment matters more than the form

Most quarries have risk assessments. Fewer have ones that changed anything: every row “medium” before controls and “low” after, filed until the next audit. The value is in the conversation with the operator who knows the loader’s blind spot, turned into controls with names and dates against them.

Risk assessment is the front end of the whole quarry hazards and controls picture: the hazard register, JSAs, inspections and critical controls all depend on it.

What Queensland law requires, and what it does not

Queensland quarries sit under the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 (MQSHA) and the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017 (MQSHR).

• MQSHA section 26 defines an acceptable level of risk: the risk must be within acceptable limits and as low as reasonably achievable. In deciding that, regard must be had to the likelihood of injury or illness and its severity, which is where the two axes of a typical risk matrix come from.
• MQSHA section 27 describes risk management as systematically identifying, analysing and assessing risk, avoiding or removing unacceptable risk, monitoring residual risk, providing for critical controls and reviewing control effectiveness.
• MQSHR section 6 requires hazard identification when operations start, during them, and when they change in size, nature or complexity.
• MQSHR section 7 requires risk to be analysed to decide whether it is acceptable, having regard to matters including incident investigations, the interaction of hazards and the reliability of controls.
• MQSHR section 8 sets the hierarchy of controls: elimination, substitution, separation, engineering, administrative, then personal protective equipment, as far as reasonably practicable.
• MQSHR section 10 covers a risk management process essential for managing a hazard at the mine. The site senior executive must ensure its record contains four details: the names and positions of those involved, a description of the hazard, the method used for assessing likelihood and consequences, and the controls proposed. It is kept at the mine until the hazard is no longer present.

Notice what is missing. Neither instrument prescribes a risk matrix, its size, labels or scores. Section 10 only requires you to record the method you used. A 5×5 matrix is one common method, not a legal requirement, and the matrix and rating bands below are examples, not a regulator’s form.

Where Recognised Standard 02 fits

Recognised Standard 02 (RS02), Control of risk management practices, is often quoted in quarry templates. It is a recognised standard under the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, listed with the coal standards on the Queensland register of recognised standards, guidelines and guidance notes. It applies to coal mines only. It does not bind a quarry. RS02 has been under review, so check the register for the version in force before quoting it.

It is still a useful picture of an auditable record: who was involved, how risk was judged and against what criteria, what was assumed, where the team disagreed and when controls will be in place. Good practice, not an obligation. For guidance that does apply to quarries, see our summary of which Queensland standards and guidance notes apply to quarries.

The method: seven steps

1. Pick the team

Include the people who do the work, not just their supervisors, plus someone who can approve spending on controls. Record names and positions.

2. Set the scope

Write down exactly what is assessed and what is not. “Crushing” is not a scope; “changing jaw liners on the primary crusher during a planned shutdown” is. Note previous incidents and inspection findings.

3. Identify hazards

Break the task into steps and ask what could go wrong at each. Use energy sources as prompts: gravity, motion, stored pressure, electricity, heat, dust and noise. Look at the job in the field, not just at the table.

4. Analyse the risk

Describe the unwanted event and credible worst consequence, then rate likelihood and consequence with existing controls as they actually perform on the day. Write down any assumption.

5. Evaluate

Compare each rating with your site’s acceptance criteria. This is a judgement against section 26, not a colour lookup: a “low” cell still fails if a cheap, available control was skipped. See our guide to acceptable level of risk at a quarry.

6. Control

Work down the hierarchy. Give each new control an owner and due date, then re-rate the residual risk. Record controls considered and rejected, with reasons, and say how critical controls will be verified.

7. Review

Set review triggers, not just a date: an incident, new plant, a change of method, a failed inspection. Then check the controls got built: open actions six months later are known, unmanaged risks.

An example 5×5 risk matrix

This is an example only, not a required format. Set your own matrix, descriptors and acceptance criteria in your safety and health management system (SHMS). In this example, the score is likelihood multiplied by consequence.

An example of how rating bands might drive action. The bands, responses and approval levels are illustrative; set your own in the SHMS.

One rule worth adopting: any hazard with a credible fatal consequence gets detailed review regardless of likelihood. Fatal times “rare” gives a reassuring number, which is how fatal risks get under-managed.

The quarry risk assessment template

Two parts: a header that captures the four details MQSHR section 10 requires plus fields good practice adds, and the assessment table. Adapt the fields to your SHMS.

Part A: Assessment details

Part B: Assessment worksheet

Add a final section for controls considered and rejected, with reasons: the part most often missing.

Worked example: loading customer road trucks at the stockpile

Scope: a front-end loader loading visiting road trucks and trailers from product stockpiles, day and night, with drivers who are not quarry employees. Team: loader operator, weighbridge operator, a customer driver, supervisor and quarry manager. Ratings are illustrative.

Considered and rejected: a spotter on foot (it puts another person beside the hazard), and banning night loading (lighting and separation bring the risk down; review after three months).

Every high and extreme row gained an engineering or separation control, not just a new rule. The fatal-consequence rows are candidates for critical controls at a Queensland quarry, and the individual task steps belong in a job safety analysis for the loader operator.

WRAC, JSA and the hazard register: how they fit

A workplace risk assessment and control (WRAC) is a broad-brush, team-based method widely used in Australian mining to rank risks across an operation. At a quarry, walk the process from face to weighbridge and rank what you find; the top hazards get a task-level assessment like the one above. A JSA sits underneath, breaking one job into steps for the crew on the day.

The hazard register holds every identified hazard with its rating, controls, owners and status; an assessment that does not end in register rows stopped at the paperwork. Our quarry hazard register template sets out the fields.

Where quarry risk assessments go wrong

• The rating fits the answer. Once the job is decided, likelihood scores drift down to match.
• Residual risk assumes perfect controls. If nobody checks the controls, the rating is a hope.
• Administrative controls everywhere. A new procedure for every risk means the hierarchy was skipped.
• Actions with no owner. “Investigate lighting” with no name and date never happens.
• Copied templates. A downloaded assessment describes somebody else’s quarry. Borrow structure, never content.

Keeping the assessment alive after the meeting

The weak point is the gap between worksheet and ground: controls agreed in a meeting, actions in a spreadsheet, inspections on paper, and nobody able to show whether the lighting towers worked on a given night.

HazView, which suits quarries as well as coal and metalliferous mines, puts the outcome of the assessment where the work happens. Each assessed hazard goes onto one interactive map of the site with its type, status, photos and history, and its controls carry an accountable owner, a due date and a status of Compliant, Non-Compliant or Ongoing. The hazard register exports to CSV or JSON in one click. Inspections built in your own format attach to the hazard they check, so verification sits next to the risk, and JSAs are logged with an expiry date and signed onto digitally. To see risk assessments turned into a live map, see how HazView works for managers or book a demo.

Frequently asked questions

Is a 5×5 risk matrix a legal requirement for a Queensland quarry?

No. MQSHA section 26 requires regard to likelihood and severity, and MQSHR section 10 requires the record to state the method used. No matrix, size or scoring is prescribed; a 5×5 is simply common.

Does Recognised Standard 02 apply to quarries?

No. RS02 is a recognised standard under the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 and applies to coal mines. Quarries are regulated under the MQSHA and MQSHR. It is still a useful reference for what an auditable record contains; check the register for the current version.

How long must a quarry keep a risk assessment record?

Under MQSHR section 10, the site senior executive must keep the record of an essential risk management process at the mine until the hazard it relates to is no longer present. Records of risk monitoring have separate retention periods under section 11.

When should a quarry risk assessment be reviewed?

After an incident, new plant or method, a failed control or a wrong assumption. MQSHR section 6 requires hazard identification during operations and when they change, so a review date alone is not enough.

The post Quarry Risk Assessment: Method, Matrix and a Worked Example appeared first on HazView®.

A crusher blockage is cleared safely only when the crusher and everything feeding it is isolated, every source of stored energy has been found and released or restrained, and the work is done from outside the crushing chamber using the manufacturer’s method. Stopping the crusher is not enough. In one fatal incident a regulator has published, the crusher was not operating when the worker was killed; in another, the regulator warns that stored energy can be released unexpectedly even when the plant is isolated.

This guide covers what the regulator alerts describe, the three common kinds of blockage and the energy each holds, Queensland’s isolation requirements, a step-by-step clearing sequence, and prevention.

What the regulator alerts show

Two Australian alerts show the pattern. In April 2020, SafeWork SA reported that a worker received fatal injuries while attempting to clear a metal tramp blockage in a cone crusher at a quarry. The alert notes that the crusher was not in operation at the time. It states that metal tramp blockages in cone crushers create large amounts of stored energy, that entering a cone crusher below the mantle to do any work should be prohibited, and that oxy cutting, thermic lance or other hot work should not be used to clear them.

In 2024, WorkSafe Queensland reported a worker fatally injured while removing an item from the jaw crusher of a concrete crushing plant. The worker had tried to remove the lodged item and was struck when it came free. The alert explains that non-crushable items entering the crusher create stored energy that can expel the item, and that stored energy can be released unexpectedly even when the plant is isolated.

The lesson in both is the same. A stopped crusher with a jammed load is a loaded spring. Isolation stops the motor; it does nothing about the energy already trapped inside.

Three kinds of crusher blockage and the energy each holds

Each type of crusher blockage has its own hazard, and a procedure that treats them all the same will miss one.

Crusher bridging at the feed opening

Crusher bridging happens when oversize rock wedges across the feed opening or the top of the jaw, and material backs up behind it in the hopper or on the feeder. The energy here is mostly gravity: the bridging rock is holding up the load above it. Free it and the whole column can drop, along with anything or anyone resting on it. The worst position is standing on the feed or above the hopper, working down at the rock.

A stalled jaw with a non-crushable item

When a non-crushable item such as a bucket tooth or a length of steel enters a jaw crusher, the jaw can stall partway through its stroke. The item is now clamped under load between the jaw plates, and the moving parts hold energy that wants to finish the stroke. The WorkSafe Queensland alert describes a worker struck when a lodged item came free. It also notes that later jaw crushers sense non-crushable items and prevent the jaws bridging or stalling, which eliminates the stall and the stored energy in the moving parts.

Tramp metal in a cone crusher

Tramp metal in a cone crusher jams between the mantle and the concave, where it can be held under great force. SafeWork SA’s alert is direct: large amounts of stored energy, extreme caution, no entry below the mantle, and no hot work to clear it. It also warns that tramp blockages can cause internal damage, which may create other safety issues. Many cone crushers have a tramp release or cavity clearing system; where yours does, the manufacturer’s instructions for it are the clearing method.

What Queensland law requires for crusher isolation

A quarry is a mine under section 9(1)(f) of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999, so the Act and the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017 apply to quarry crushing plant. Several sections of the Regulation bear directly on clearing a crusher blockage.

• Section 107, isolating, locking-out and tagging plant. The mine’s safety and health management system must provide for isolating plant, including effectively isolating it to control the risk from a release of energy, taking plant out of service, testing plant or its energy source for zero potential, and returning plant to service. A mine that is not required to have a safety and health management system must have a standard work instruction covering the same matters. Where a person’s safety is directly affected by plant operating or not operating, the system or instruction must also provide for locking-out and tagging.
• Section 103, isolation facility. Where it is necessary to manage the risk, the site senior executive must ensure plant has a facility for preventing its operation, preventing or controlling the release of its stored energy, or isolating its energy supply, and that the facility can be locked-out and tagged or otherwise secured.
• Section 106, operating plant. Plant must not be operated if it is locked-out and tagged.
• Section 102, plant controls. A remote control system must be capable of being disabled at the plant, and an automatic control system must be capable of being disabled at the plant and overridden manually. For a circuit started from a control room, that pathway must be shut off before anyone works on the crusher.

Section 107 does not stop at isolating the power. It names the release of energy and testing for zero potential, which is exactly the gap both alerts describe.

Workers carry obligations too. Under section 36A of the Act, a worker must manage the risk to themselves and others in their own work so that it is at an acceptable level, and must participate in and conform to the mine’s risk management practices. A procedure the crew bypasses for a quick clear is a failure on both sides.

For practical detail, the Queensland register of recognised standards, guidelines and guidance notes lists QGN 02 Isolation of plant under guidance notes for mineral mines and quarries. Guidance notes are issued to help operators meet their obligations. They are not mandatory; the obligations sit in the Act and the Regulation. Our guide to isolation and lockout on quarry plant covers personal locks, group isolation and testing for dead in more depth.

A safe sequence for clearing a crusher blockage

The steps below follow the two alerts and the Regulation. Your site’s procedure must be built from the manufacturer’s manual for your crusher; this is the skeleton.

1. Stop the feed, then the crusher. Stop the feeder and everything upstream so no more material arrives.
2. Name the blockage type. Bridging, a stalled jaw or tramp metal in a cone. Each has a different energy source.
3. Isolate the whole circuit. The crusher drive, the feeder, upstream conveyors that can deliver material, hydraulic power packs, and any remote or automatic start. Every person working on the job fits their own personal lock.
4. Find the stored energy. The WorkSafe Queensland alert lists identification and assessment of potential stored energy areas as part of the safe system. Typical sources are rock held up by a bridge, a jaw stalled mid-stroke, a flywheel still turning, hydraulic pressure in clamping or adjustment circuits, and tension in springs.
5. Release or restrain it, as the manufacturer says. Bleed hydraulic pressure, let the flywheel stop, and use the crusher’s own clearing or release systems where they exist. Do not improvise a release method on the day.
6. Test for zero. Try the start controls at the crusher and confirm nothing moves. Confirm pressure gauges read zero. This is the “testing for zero potential” in section 107.
7. Position people out of the line of release. The WorkSafe Queensland alert is specific: not above the hopper and not where an ejected obstruction could drop. Allow for the item leaving the machine footprint entirely, and enforce exclusion zones as the manufacturer recommends.
8. Clear from outside the chamber. Use the manufacturer’s method and purpose-built equipment. No one enters a cone crusher below the mantle, and no hot work is used on tramp metal in a cone.
9. Inspect before restart. Check for internal damage, which SafeWork SA warns tramp blockages can cause. Refit and secure every guard, and test interlocks and emergency stops.
10. Return to service formally. Each person removes their own lock, the area is clear, and the restart is announced. Section 107 makes returning plant to service a step in its own right.

Where crusher blockage clearing goes wrong

Most failures are not a missing procedure. They are a procedure that does not match how blockages get cleared on a busy shift.

• “It’s off, so it’s safe.” The most dangerous assumption. The SafeWork SA fatality happened at a crusher that was not operating.
• Isolating the crusher but not the feeder. A feeder that starts while someone is freeing a bridge will deliver rock onto them.
• Bars and wedges from above. Working down into the hopper with a bar puts the worker directly in the line of the rock when it frees.
• Clearing becomes routine. A crusher that blocks every shift gets cleared on autopilot. The same pattern is behind guards left off where spillage is cleared, covered in our guide to conveyor guarding at quarries.

Preventing the blockage in the first place

SafeWork SA’s first risk control is to consider and use engineering controls to minimise the risk of tramp blockages. WorkSafe Queensland points to pre-screening so incompatible material does not enter the process. In practice that means:

• Remove tramp metal before the crusher. Magnets and metal detectors on the feed conveyor, and a process for what happens when they trip.
• Control oversize at the source. Secondary breakage at the face or a rock breaker at the grizzly, so bridging rock never reaches the feed opening.
• Look after ground engaging tools. Lost bucket teeth and adaptors are a common source of tramp steel; a missing tooth reported at prestart is a blockage prevented.
• Specify crushers that protect themselves. When buying or replacing plant, protection that prevents a stall removes the stored energy hazard at the design stage.
• Treat repeat blockages as a hazard to fix. Record each one. A pattern by shift, feed source or crusher setting points to the engineering fix.

Mobile crushing trains add set-up and relocation hazards, covered in our guide to mobile crushing and screening plant safety. Crushing sits alongside the other major plant risks in the quarry hazards and controls overview.

Crusher blockage summary table

Keeping isolation verifiable, shift after shift

The weak point in most crusher procedures is not the document. It is proving, at three in the morning, that each step was done, and noticing that the same crusher has blocked four times this week. A paper sheet in the crib room does neither.

HazView suits quarries as well as open cut mines. A site can build its crusher clearing steps as a custom checklist, modelled on our isolation verification checklist, with a question for each energy source, photos of locks and gauges, and the completer’s sign-off plus a supervisor countersignature. Conditional logic can open an escalation section when an answer is not right, for example when stored energy cannot be released as the manual describes. Checklists work offline in the app, which matters inside a steel crusher house, and sync when the device is back in reception.

Crushers and feeders can sit on the site map as hazards with controls that carry an accountable owner, due date and status, and the hazard register exports to CSV or JSON for review. Workers on the crushing plant can see the hazards and controls on the same map as everyone else; see HazView for every worker, or book a demo to see the checklist builder.

Frequently asked questions

Is it safe to clear a crusher blockage once the crusher has stopped?

No. A stopped crusher can still hold stored energy in the jammed material, a stalled jaw, the flywheel and the hydraulics. SafeWork SA’s alert describes a fatality at a cone crusher that was not operating. Isolate, release or restrain the stored energy, and test for zero before anyone starts clearing.

Can tramp metal in a cone crusher be cut out with a torch?

No. SafeWork SA’s alert says oxy cutting, thermic lance or other hot work methods should not be used to clear metal tramp blockages in cone crushers. Use the crusher’s own release and clearing systems as the manufacturer describes.

Does Queensland law require a written procedure for crusher isolation?

Yes. Section 107 of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017 requires the safety and health management system to provide for isolating plant, including to control the risk from a release of energy, testing for zero potential and returning plant to service. A mine without a safety and health management system needs a standard work instruction covering the same matters.

Is QGN 02 mandatory?

No. QGN 02 Isolation of plant is listed on the Queensland register as a guidance note, and guidance notes are issued to help operators meet their obligations. The obligations themselves are in the Act and the Regulation, including section 107.

Should anyone ever enter the crushing chamber to clear a blockage?

For a cone crusher, SafeWork SA says entry below the mantle to do any work should be prohibited. For any crusher, the procedure should be designed so blockages are cleared from outside the chamber with the manufacturer’s method and purpose-built equipment. If a task seems to need entry, stop and escalate it.

The post Clearing Crusher Blockages Safely: Bridging, Tramp Metal and Stored Energy appeared first on HazView®.

QGN 27 collision prevention is the Queensland guidance note that tells mineral mines and quarries how to identify and control collisions between vehicles (V2V), vehicles and people (V2P), and vehicles and infrastructure (V2I). Issued by the Mines Inspectorate of Resources Safety and Health Queensland (RSHQ) and compiled by its Mineral Mines and Quarries Inspectorate, the current version is Revision 2, dated April 2024. It is guidance, not law, but it describes the way an inspector expects a quarry to think about traffic, and it sits on top of real obligations in the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999.

Why collision prevention gets its own guidance note

A quarry is a small site with a lot of mixed traffic. Loaders work the stockpiles, haul trucks run between the face and the crusher, light vehicles carry fitters and supervisors, and customer road trucks queue at the weighbridge and drive onto the loading area. Pedestrians move between all of it: the operator walking from crib room to machine, the fitter working on a conveyor beside a haul road, the visitor who parked in the wrong place.

QGN 27 opens with the point that matters: the growth in the number, size and speed of vehicles has made unsafe V2V, V2P and V2I interactions among the largest groups of high potential incidents at mines and quarries, and vehicle incidents remain a major factor in injuries and fatalities. A loader operator who cannot see a person standing behind the counterweight has no second chance. That is why the note treats collision prevention as a high priority for mine management, not a matter left to driver care.

What QGN 27 is, and what it is not

Queensland mining safety uses three kinds of published instrument, and they carry different weight. The register of recognised standards, guidelines and guidance notes sets them out. Recognised standards are made under section 72(1) of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 and apply to coal mines. Guidelines are made under section 63(1) of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 (MQSHA), and under section 34(3), where a guideline states a way of achieving an acceptable level of risk, a person discharges their obligation only by following a stated way or another way that achieves a level of risk equal to or better than the acceptable level. Guidance notes, the register says, are issued to help operators meet their safety and health obligations.

The note itself, QGN 27 Collision Prevention, states plainly that it is not a guideline under the MQSHA and not a recognised standard under the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999. It also warns that following it may not always be enough to comply with the legislation. So QGN 27 is not mandatory. What it does give you is the inspectorate’s own picture of a credible collision prevention system, which is a useful benchmark when your traffic arrangements are reviewed after an incident.

It applies to surface and underground operations, and its scope is the risk to persons from collisions between vehicles, between vehicles and persons, and between vehicles and infrastructure.

The legislation underneath it

The obligations themselves sit in the Act and the Regulation, not in the guidance note:

• Acceptable level of risk. Section 26 of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 says risk is at an acceptable level only when it is within acceptable limits and as low as reasonably achievable. QGN 27 repeats this test in its risk assessment section.
• Risk management. Section 27 describes risk management as including identifying and assessing risk, providing for critical controls, investigating serious accidents and high potential incidents, and reviewing the effectiveness of controls.
• The site senior executive. Under section 39, the SSE must ensure risk from operations is at an acceptable level and develop and implement a safety and health management system for everyone at the mine, including contractors.
• Layout and roads. Section 45 of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017 requires mine layout, design and construction to have regard to listed matters, including access and travel-ways and vehicle interaction. Section 46 requires the road design and construction specification to enable the safe movement of vehicles, having regard to the vehicles, the road materials and the mine’s operations.
• Reporting. Schedule 2 of the Regulation lists an unplanned movement of, or a failure to stop, a vehicle among the types of serious accidents and high potential incidents.

One point of terminology: the quarry Act and Regulation do not use the term “principal hazard”. If you have come from coal, New South Wales or Western Australia, the comparison in managing vehicle interaction as a principal hazard explains how the other frameworks label the same risk.

Start with scenarios, not with rules

QGN 27 says vehicle interactions must be part of hazard identification, and that every collision scenario should be considered, including ones that have never happened at your site. Its suggested sources are worth listing because most quarries use only one or two of them:

• Inspection of known and possible collision locations.
• Existing risk assessments and risk registers.
• Analysis of how mobile plant and pedestrians actually move.
• Previous accidents and incidents, internal and external.
• Consultation with workers.
• Manufacturer information such as stopping distances and fields of vision.
• Traffic management and road design specialists.

Two instructions in the note do most of the work. First, map the sequence of events leading to each collision, so you can see where in time and space a control can break the chain. Second, avoid generalising: two scenarios can look alike and still need different controls. “Loader versus person” at the stockpile is not the same problem as “loader versus person” at the workshop door.

The note also reminds you that every collision involves mobile plant, and that plant can encroach on activities that are not about plant at all. Non-routine work, such as a pump change in a sump or a fence repair beside a haul road, needs the same collision thinking as production.

Method and controls

QGN 27 suggests a structured method such as a Workplace Risk Assessment and Control (WRAC) or a bowtie, ideally with a trained facilitator. Controls should focus on elimination, substitution and engineering. It sets out four steps: identify likely scenarios, list all controls, identify the critical controls, and identify how each control will be implemented and monitored. It adds that a task should not go ahead unless its critical controls are known, in place and checked. Appendix 4 works this through for a loader hitting a pedestrian walking on a roadway, pairing every control with how it will be monitored. Our guide to critical controls at a Queensland quarry covers that step in more depth.

The traffic management system

QGN 27 describes a traffic management system (TMS) as part of the mine’s safety and health management system, holding the standards and requirements for collision prevention. It expects responsibilities to be named and the SSE to ensure all mobile plant on site complies with it, whoever owns or operates the plant. That last point matters at a quarry, where hired plant, contract crushing crews and customer trucks can outnumber your own fleet. Our contractor management guide covers bringing them inside the system.

Design and layout

Design decisions create the environment everyone then has to work in. The note’s checklist includes road and ramp width, gradient, intersections, drainage and room for bunds, signage and run-offs, plus glare, fixed plant, stockpiles, fuel bays, buildings, pedestrian access points, parking bays, site access, public interaction and the ability to separate light and heavy vehicles. It also asks sites to compile plans showing every road, structure and area where plant and pedestrians may meet, and to use them to test planned changes before they are built. Intersections deserve particular attention, and the principles in mine road intersection design apply at quarry scale.

Plant selection, hired plant and road maintenance

Procurement standards should cover brakes, horns and reversing alarms, lights and beacons, unique identification numbers, operator visibility, aftermarket accessories that block the view, cameras and communications. Plant not owned by the mine should be fit for purpose, maintained to at least the manufacturer’s specification and compatible with site systems. Road maintenance needs a routine schedule for bunds, delineators and signs, and its own traffic controls to protect people working on the ground.

Technology in the cab

The note covers collision avoidance technology, such as cameras, radar and RFID, that can warn an operator of a vehicle, person or structure outside their field of view. It is explicit that these systems cannot replace design, engineering and administrative controls and are not a “silver bullet”. Appendix 2 lists questions to ask before selecting one, including whether it suits V2V, V2P or V2I and whether operators will start to rely on it as the first line of defence.

The traffic management plan

Within the TMS, QGN 27 expects a current traffic management plan, underpinned by risk assessment. It should be documented and auditable, list the site’s foreseeable interactions, set out how each is managed, include a current drawing showing critical information, name responsibilities, say how controls will be monitored, and be reviewed periodically, after changes in operations or plant, after incidents, and when information suggests it is not working. The structure overlaps closely with our quarry traffic management plan guide, written for Western Australia but useful as a working template.

Traffic rules that hold up

Rules are administrative controls, the weakest tier, and QGN 27 is demanding about them. They should be documented and enforceable, as few as possible, consistent with general Queensland traffic rules, cover pedestrian movement around plant, and apply to everyone, including contractors and the public. Each rule should be needed, clear and never based on assumption or convention, able to be monitored, understood by workers, and checked so it does not create a new hazard.

For V2P at a quarry, the sample table in Appendix 4 points to rules such as pedestrians not walking in traffic areas unless authorised, crossing only at designated points, and initiating communication with an operator before entering an area where plant is working, with confirmation that the message was received. Physical separation always beats a rule, and our guide to quarry vehicle and pedestrian segregation goes through walkways, barriers and exclusion zones at the weighbridge, loading area and workshop.

Separation and stopping distances

Appendix 3 is short and often ignored. Site separation and stopping distances must be greater than the measured stopping distance of the vehicle with the worst braking distance, under the worst road, vehicle and operator conditions: wet and downhill, fully laden at maximum speed, a tired or distracted operator. The distance must also allow for operator reaction time and the mechanical delay before the brakes bite.

The worked example is sobering. At 40 km/h, a combined reaction and mechanical delay of 2 seconds means the vehicle travels about 22.2 metres before braking begins. With a nominated separation of 50 metres, the vehicle then has only about 27.8 metres to stop, which may not be enough depending on payload, road surface and brakes. If your site rule says “keep 50 metres” without that arithmetic behind it, the rule is a number, not a control.

Where quarries usually fall short

• The plan is a policy, not a map. QGN 27 asks for a current drawing showing critical information. Many plans are text with an aerial photo from three years and two stockpile moves ago.
• Customer trucks sit outside the system. Road trucks and their drivers are treated as visitors, yet they drive onto the loading area beside a loader every few minutes.
• Scenarios are generic. “Vehicle strikes person” appears once in the risk register, rather than as distinct scenarios at the stockpile, the crusher feed and the workshop.
• Rules multiply. Every incident adds a rule, nobody removes one, and the induction becomes a list operators cannot recall.
• Controls are never checked. The note pairs every control with a monitoring method. Few sites can show when a crossing, a bund or a parking layout was last inspected against its standard.
• Layout changes go unreviewed. A new stockpile or a relocated mobile crusher changes traffic flow overnight without any management of change.

Keeping the traffic picture current

Most of what QGN 27 asks for is visibility: a current plan of where vehicles and people meet, a list of the controls at each place, and proof that someone checked them. At most quarries those three things live in different places, and the drawing is the first to go stale.

HazView suits quarries as well as open cut coal and metalliferous mines. It puts the site on one interactive map, over survey DXFs or drone imagery, so intersections, crossings, parking areas and exclusion zones can be drawn where they actually are, each with photos, properties and history, and areas can be set as open, restricted or closed. Controls attach to those hazards with an accountable owner, due date and status, and inspections are custom checklists built to the site’s own traffic standard, pinned to a location on the map, with photos and a PDF record. The hazard register exports to CSV or JSON for the TMP review. It is not an in-cab system, does not connect to proximity detection or collision avoidance systems, and does not replace anything a machine carries. The HazView for managers page shows how it supports a site’s management system, or you can book a demo to see the map on a layout like yours.

For the wider set of risks at a quarry and how they connect, see our guide to quarry hazards and controls.

Frequently asked questions

Is QGN 27 mandatory?

No. QGN 27 is a guidance note issued by the RSHQ Mines Inspectorate. It states that it is not a guideline under the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 or a recognised standard, and that following it may not be enough to comply with the legislation. The legal duties sit in the Act and the Regulation.

What do V2V, V2P and V2I mean?

They are the three interaction types in QGN 27: vehicle to vehicle, vehicle to person, and vehicle to infrastructure. A loader reversing into a light vehicle is V2V, a truck striking a pedestrian at a crossing is V2P, and a truck hitting a conveyor leg or a fuel bowser is V2I.

What is the current version of QGN 27?

The current version is Revision 2, dated April 2024, titled QGN 27 Collision Prevention, for mineral mines and quarries. Guidance notes are updated from time to time, so check the RSHQ register before relying on any version.

Does QGN 27 require proximity detection at a quarry?

No. It describes collision avoidance technology as a further level of protection that cannot replace design, engineering and administrative controls, and proximity detection appears in Appendix 4 only as one possible control in the worked loader example. If a site does select a system, the note expects people with suitable technical knowledge in the risk assessment and a review of operator training.

Who is responsible for collision prevention at a Queensland quarry?

The site senior executive must ensure risk is at an acceptable level and implement the safety and health management system, which QGN 27 says includes the traffic management system. The operator must give the SSE adequate resources to implement it. Every worker, contractor and visitor still has to follow it.

The post QGN 27 Collision Prevention: V2V, V2P and V2I at a Quarry appeared first on HazView®.

QGN 38 is the Queensland guidance note on reviewing the effectiveness of safety and health management systems for metalliferous mines and quarries. Its message is simple: most operators audit whether the SHMS documents line up with standards, and far fewer test whether the system is actually holding risk at an acceptable level on the ground. QGN 38 is about the second kind of audit, and it tells you where to look and what counts as evidence.

This guide covers what QGN 38 is and how much legal weight it carries, the duty in the Act that sits behind it, the difference between a compliance audit and an effectiveness audit, the elements it asks you to test, and a practical review plan for a quarry. It is written for mineral mines and quarries under the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999. Coal mines have their own guidance note, QGN 09, covered in our guide to reviewing SHMS effectiveness at a coal mine.

What QGN 38 is, and what it is not

QGN 38 is titled “Reviewing the effectiveness of Safety and Health Management Systems for metalliferous mines and quarries”. The current version is Revision 2, dated March 2026, issued by the Mines Inspectorate of Resources Safety and Health Queensland (RSHQ) and compiled by its Mineral Mines and Quarries Inspectorate. It is listed under mineral mines and quarries on the Queensland register of recognised standards, guidelines and guidance notes.

It is a guidance note, not law. The document says itself that it is not a guideline as defined in the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999, and that in some circumstances complying with it may not be enough to comply with the legislation. A guideline made under the Act states a way of achieving an acceptable level of risk; a guidance note is there to help operators meet their obligations. Treat QGN 38 as the inspectorate telling you how it thinks an effectiveness review should be done, which is worth knowing, but not as a checklist that discharges the duty on its own.

It also matters that a quarry is a mine. Section 9(1)(f) of the Act includes a quarry in the meaning of mine, so every SHMS obligation below applies to a quarry in the same way it applies to a metalliferous mine. QGN 38 opens on exactly that point.

The legal duty behind the review

QGN 38 hangs off a short list of provisions in the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999. These, not the guidance note, are what an inspector enforces.

• Section 39(1)(c): the site senior executive (SSE) must develop and implement an SHMS for all persons at the mine, including contractors.
• Section 38(1)(f): the operator must audit and review the effectiveness and implementation of the SHMS to ensure the risk to persons from operations is at an acceptable level. Section 38(1)(g) adds the duty to provide adequate resources for it.
• Section 55(5)(f) to (h): the SHMS must contain a way of measuring, monitoring and evaluating its own performance, a way of correcting things that do not conform, a plan to regularly review and continually improve it, and a plan to review it immediately after a significant change to operations.
• Section 26: an acceptable level of risk means within acceptable limits and as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), judged on likelihood and severity.
• Section 44A(3)(d): officers of a corporation must exercise due diligence, which includes taking reasonable steps to ensure the corporation has processes for receiving and considering information about incidents, hazards, risks and critical controls, and for responding to it in a timely way.

The split is deliberate. The SSE builds and runs the system; the operator checks that it works. QGN 38 makes a point of saying the operator cannot transfer that obligation to the SSE. A review left entirely to the SSE, with no operator ownership, misses the point of the section.

Compliance audit versus effectiveness audit

The core of QGN 38 is a comparison between two kinds of audit. A compliance audit asks “are we doing things right?”: does the documented system match the regulation, the corporate standard and the site’s own procedures. An effectiveness audit asks “are we doing the right things, and are they working?”: do the controls actually prevent harm on the ground.

QGN 38’s own example makes the difference plain. A compliance audit checks that a training framework for safety policy exists. An effectiveness audit checks how well workers understand the policy and whether their behaviour has changed because of the training. One reads documents; the other talks to people and looks at the pit.

Two statements in the note carry most of the weight. First, a procedure, a training record or a risk assessment is not a control in itself; it may only record what the control is. Second, controls must be physically checked and objective evidence obtained that they are performing as intended, and that physical check must be the focus of the audit. A sampling approach is expected, so the findings rest on a recognised sample rather than a single example.

What QGN 38 asks you to test

The note works through a sample of SHMS elements and says the same method should be applied to other elements according to the mine’s risk profile. For a quarry, the following carry most of the load.

Policy, procedures and management structure

Sample procedures and check that workers were trained and assessed in them, can name the controls they rely on, and know what to do when a procedure does not work. For the management structure, QGN 38 points out it is not an organisation chart but the people, responsibilities and competencies set out under section 50 of the Act. Interview the people in it and test whether they can explain how they carry out their role. More on the build side is in our guide to the safety and health management system for a quarry.

Risk management and critical controls

Check that broadbrush, process and personal risk assessments were done with the right people in the room, that chronic, latent and psychosocial risks were considered, that incident findings fed back in, and that controls are quantified: specific, measurable and actually implemented. For material unwanted events, the audit should confirm the operator has set its MUE threshold, that each MUE has critical controls, and that there is a formal process validating those controls and reviewing them regularly. The 2024 amendments behind this are covered in critical controls at a Queensland quarry.

Health hazards

Dust, respirable crystalline silica, noise, heat and chemicals injure slowly and never show up in an incident rate. QGN 38 asks whether monitoring is being done, whether workers get their personal monitoring results, and whether the site is relying on PPE rather than higher order controls. Section 136 of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017 already requires the SSE to monitor and regularly analyse worker exposure where a hazard could exceed its exposure limit or the risk may vary, so the review should find those results and what was done with them. At a quarry that usually means starting with respirable dust and silica.

Incidents and reporting culture

Confirm that everything meeting the meaning of a high potential incident or serious accident was reported to the regulator and investigated, and look for “minimising language” that talks a potential outcome down. Then go to the workplace and check that the controls from past investigations are actually in place.

Workforce, competence and contractors

Training records alone do not prove competence. QGN 38 wants a cross section of workers, supervisors, managers and contractors asked to demonstrate the task: isolate the plant, explain the warning lights, carry out a workplace inspection. It also covers site safety and health representatives, fitness for work, respiratory health surveillance and contractor safety and health management plans, including evidence that contractor work is actually monitored. See contractor management at a quarry.

Supervision, plant, isolation and emergencies

Supervisors should be able to name the critical controls for the work in their area and spend enough time with workers to oversee it. Plant should be on a register, pre-started, inspected and maintained, with a physical inspection of safety critical components such as brakes, tyres and electrical protection. QGN 38 expects isolation to be documented, trained and periodically checked by supervisors, with a test for dead before work starts; our isolation and lockout guide for quarry plant goes further. For emergencies, section 40 of the Regulation already requires the SSE to test and review the emergency response plan at least once a year; QGN 38 adds that live and simulated responses should get a formal debrief with the actions implemented. See our quarry emergency response plan guide.

Audit findings and KPIs

QGN 38 expects previous audit and inspection findings, including the regulator’s, to have documented corrective actions that were implemented, or a documented reason why not. KPIs can mix lead and lag indicators, should measure quality rather than quantity, and should not be linked, or seen to be linked, to reward or discipline, because that discourages open reporting.

A review plan for a quarry

A quarry does not need a corporate audit team to do this well. It needs a plan that makes the review physical, sampled and owned by the operator. One workable sequence:

1. Set the scope from the risk profile. Start from the hazard register and the MUE list, not from the SHMS table of contents. Pick the elements that carry the most risk at this site.
2. Choose the reviewer. The operator owns the review. Use someone with enough independence from day to day operations to report bad news.
3. Define the sample. For each element, decide which procedures, controls, workers, contractors and plant items will be checked, and how many.
4. Write the evidence test before you go. For each control, state what you expect to see if it is working: the guard fixed in place, the bund at the right height, the isolation point labelled.
5. Go to the pit. Physically check controls, watch tasks, and interview a cross section of the workforce, including contractors and the night shift if there is one.
6. Close the loop on old findings. Trace last year’s corrective actions to the ground and confirm they are in place.
7. Report to the operator and officers. Findings, the evidence behind each, and actions with an owner and a due date.
8. Feed it back into the SHMS. Update risk assessments, procedures and KPIs, and record what changed.

The table below turns that into the evidence a reviewer should leave with.

Where quarry reviews go wrong

• The review never leaves the office. Every document is current and nothing in the pit was checked. QGN 38 says the physical check is the focus.
• The operator leaves it to the SSE. The duty to audit and review sits with the operator under section 38(1)(f), and QGN 38 says it cannot be transferred to the SSE.
• Counting activity. A hundred completed inspections measures a schedule, not whether the inspections found anything or whether the findings were fixed.
• Contractors left out. At many quarries contractors do the drilling, blasting, crushing campaigns and shutdown work. Excluding them excludes much of the risk.
• Chronic exposure ignored. No incident, so no finding, which is exactly how silica and noise harm goes unnoticed.
• Old findings closed on paper. The action says “done”; the bund was never rebuilt.

Keeping the evidence ready between reviews

Most of the effort in an effectiveness review is spent finding evidence: which inspections were done, what they found, which controls are in place, which actions are still open and who owns them. When that lives in folders, spreadsheets and a whiteboard map, the reviewer spends days rebuilding the picture before testing anything.

HazView suits quarries and metalliferous mines as well as coal, and it is built to keep that evidence on one live map of the site. Hazards are recorded where they are, with type, status, photos and history. Controls sit on each hazard with an accountable owner, a due date and a status, so an open or non-compliant control is visible rather than buried. Inspections run on fully custom checklists, including offline, with photos and comments on each question and a PDF record on submit, so a site can build its own control verification or effectiveness sampling form. The full hazard register exports with one click to CSV or JSON for the reviewer to work from. The judgement on whether risk is at an acceptable level stays with people; the platform keeps the record that judgement relies on. See how it works for managers and site senior executives, or book a demo.

For the wider picture of hazards and controls at a quarry, start with our guide to quarry hazards and controls.

Frequently asked questions

Is QGN 38 mandatory?

No. QGN 38 is a guidance note issued by the RSHQ Mines Inspectorate. It is not a guideline under the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999, and complying with it may not be enough on its own. The legal duty to audit and review the SHMS sits in section 38(1)(f) of the Act.

Does QGN 38 apply to quarries?

Yes. It is written for metalliferous mines and quarries, and section 9(1)(f) of the Act makes a quarry a mine. Coal mines are covered by a separate guidance note, QGN 09.

Who must review the effectiveness of the SHMS?

The operator. The SSE develops and implements the SHMS under section 39(1)(c), and the operator must audit and review its effectiveness and implementation under section 38(1)(f). QGN 38 notes that the operator cannot transfer that obligation to the SSE.

How often should a quarry SHMS be reviewed?

The Act does not set a fixed interval. Section 55(5) requires the SHMS to contain a plan to review it regularly and a plan to review it immediately after a significant change to operations. QGN 38 adds that the effectiveness audit is periodic, with documented KPIs testing performance between audits.

What is the difference between a compliance audit and an effectiveness audit?

A compliance audit checks that the documented system matches the rules. An effectiveness audit checks that the controls actually work, by physically inspecting them, sampling tasks and interviewing workers. QGN 38 is about the second.

Is a training record enough to show a worker is competent?

Not for an effectiveness audit. QGN 38 says reviewing training records is not enough, and asks that a cross section of the workforce be checked to show they can explain or demonstrate the safety requirements of their tasks.

The post QGN 38: Reviewing Whether Your Quarry’s SHMS Actually Works appeared first on HazView®.

A job safety analysis (JSA) is a task-based risk assessment that a work team completes at the job site before starting work: the job is broken into steps, the hazards in each step are identified, a control is agreed for every hazard, and everyone doing the job signs on. In Queensland, the job safety analysis mining and quarry crews complete is described in Guidance Note QGN 17, and this page gives you its method, a complete JSA form and a worked quarry example.

It covers where QGN 17 sits in the law, when a JSA is the wrong tool, how to fill in each part of the form, and a filled-in example for replacing conveyor skirt rubbers.

Why a bad JSA is worse than no JSA

QGN 17 opens with a warning: a poorly completed JSA can increase risk, because the crew believes it has done a risk assessment and therefore has suitable controls. The guidance note calls this a false sense of risk control and security.

The symptoms are familiar: a JSA photocopied from last month, “follow procedure” on every line of the controls column, and signatures from people who arrived after it was written. That is a record that a form was filled in, not a risk assessment.

What QGN 17 is, and what it is not

QGN 17 Development of effective job safety analysis is listed on the Queensland register of recognised standards, guidelines and guidance notes under the guidance notes for mineral mines and quarries. The QGN 17 document linked from the register is marked “Updated October 2010” and was issued by the Mines Inspectorate for operations under the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999.

It is a guidance note, not a guideline or a recognised standard, and says itself that following it may not always be enough to comply with the legislation. A guideline made by the Minister under section 63 of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 is admissible in evidence under section 64 where a person is said to have failed to achieve an acceptable level of risk. A guidance note is issued to help operators meet their obligations; nothing in QGN 17 is mandatory in its own right.

The obligations it helps you meet are real, though. The Act defines risk as the risk of injury or illness arising out of a hazard, measured in terms of consequences and likelihood (section 19), and sets out what effective risk management is in section 27. The Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017 then sets the duties a JSA helps meet:

• Sections 6, 7 and 9: each person with an obligation to manage risk must identify hazards in their own work, analyse whether the risk is acceptable, and monitor it.
• Section 8: that person must, as far as reasonably practicable, apply controls in order: elimination, substitution, separation, engineering, administrative, then PPE.
• Sections 114 to 117: the site senior executive must ensure written procedures or standard work instructions exist where operations need to be uniform or compatible, carry a version number and date, and are available to the workers they apply to.

QGN 17 quotes the 2001 regulation, since replaced by the 2017 regulation; every provision it quotes keeps its section number. The register lists QGN 17 for mineral mines and quarries; coal sits under separate legislation, though the technique transfers.

When a JSA is the right tool, and when it is not

QGN 17 places the JSA as a basic, low-level tool above individual, informal checks such as a Take 5, and below the formal methods used for projects, changes and major hazards, such as bow tie analysis, fault tree analysis, HAZOP and FMEA. A JSA should only be applied when:

• the hazards and resulting risks are known to be low;
• there is no procedure or standard work instruction (SWI) for the job; or
• a procedure or SWI is being developed, modified or reviewed.

A JSA should not be the primary tool for identifying hazards and controls where the job:

• could cause serious injury, illness, equipment damage or environmental harm;
• is new, unusual or complex, or uses new equipment, tools or chemicals;
• runs longer than one shift or involves multiple work teams;
• has a history of accidents or near misses;
• involves many interdependent systems, such as electrical, mechanical and hydraulic; or
• faces a new regulatory requirement or a changed process.

Those jobs need a formal risk assessment by an appropriate team, which rules out a lot of crushing plant maintenance. Nor, says QGN 17, is a JSA a personal prestart check or a permit to work; for the shift pre-start, see pre-start inspection requirements in mining. A job that needs a fuller assessment should feed your quarry hazard register rather than live on a one-off form.

How to write a JSA the QGN 17 way

Do it at the job, with the people doing the job

QGN 17 says JSAs should be done at the job site before the work, by people with hands-on knowledge of the job and a supervisor who knows it. Every JSA must be job-specific: there should be no generic JSA; that is an SWI.

Fill in the identification and resources

Each JSA needs a job number, description, location, the names of those involved and a signature column. Then list resources: isolation equipment, permits, tools and parts, competencies, PPE, drawings and safe access. QGN 17 separates resources from controls: a working at height permit is a resource, the lanyard is the control.

Break the job into steps that start with a verb

Steps that are too general hide hazards, but avoid too many. Keep them in sequence, since a step out of order can miss or create a hazard, and start each with a verb: isolate, remove, fit, test.

Find the hazards by thinking in energy

Look for visible, hidden and developing hazards, and those whose consequence grows over time, such as creep in a hydraulic ram. QGN 17’s prompt list is built on energy: gravity, chemical, electrical, mechanical, pressure, radiant, magnetic, bio-mechanical and biological. Consider knock-on effects, previous incidents and handover to the next shift.

Give every hazard a real control and an owner

Every hazard needs at least one realistic control, chosen using the hierarchy of controls and in place while the job is done; each can have a responsible person. Blanket “as per procedure” controls, says QGN 17, show the JSA was not thoroughly completed; a procedure can be part of a control, not a substitute.

Sign on, approve, keep it at the job

Everyone involved signs, only after reading, understanding and agreeing with it. QGN 17 calls JSAs quasi-legal documents, often used in investigations and court cases. A copy must be available at the workplace during the job, then goes into document control.

QGN 17 recommends risk scoring only where a JSA is used to develop a procedure or SWI, because every identified hazard should get a control rather than be accepted. Its suggested approval levels:

The JSA template

This form follows the QGN 17 sample forms, with sign-on and end-of-job review sections added.

Part A: Job identification

Part B: Resources required

Part C: Job steps, hazards and controls

Part D: Team sign-on

Part E: Approval and review

Worked example: replacing skirt rubbers at a conveyor transfer point

Two fitters replace worn skirt rubbers where a crusher discharge conveyor loads a stockpile conveyor. There is no SWI and the job takes one team one shift: a reasonable JSA job. This shows the level of detail, not your site’s answer.

The isolation procedure is part of a control rather than the control, and step 3 deals with stored energy, which QGN 17 illustrates with a chain falling because a hydraulic cylinder crept. See also isolation and lockout on quarry crushing plant and, for step 4, conveyor guarding at a quarry. If this transfer point had an incident history, the answer would be a formal risk assessment and an SWI.

Where JSAs go wrong

QGN 17 names three main problems: missing hazards, hazards listed but not acted on, and unclear instructions. In practice:

• The recycled JSA. Last week’s form, re-dated. If it is the same every time, it should be an SWI.
• The JSA doing a risk assessment’s job. High-consequence, complex or multi-team work forced onto a one-page form.
• Signing without being there. QGN 17 says endorsement is of no value from people who were not involved.
• The frozen JSA. QGN 17 expects review during the job, changes recorded and communicated, and the JSA repeated if the job cannot be done as written, after an accident, or if the method, process or environment changes.
• The JSA nobody can find. Signed in the crib room and left there, neither at the job nor in the record.

For the hazards a JSA should never be stretched to cover, see quarry hazards and controls.

Keeping JSAs visible and current

The hard part is knowing which JSAs are live, who has signed onto each, and which are out of date. On paper, that sits in a crib room folder until an incident sends someone looking. In HazView, a JSA is logged with an expiry date and the JSA document attached, and workers sign onto it digitally, so a supervisor can see who has signed onto each JSA and when it expires. HazView suits quarries as well as open cut coal and metalliferous mines. See how one client request improved JSA visibility and HazView for every worker. To see it on your own site, book a demo.

Frequently asked questions

Is QGN 17 mandatory?

No. QGN 17 is a guidance note, not a guideline or a recognised standard. The regulation’s duties to identify hazards, analyse risk and apply controls are mandatory; QGN 17 is advice on one way to meet them.

What is the difference between a JSA and a Take 5?

A Take 5 is an individual, informal check. A JSA is a team assessment of a specific job, broken into steps, with controls and sign-on. QGN 17 places the Take 5 below the JSA.

Is a JSA the same as a job hazard analysis?

Broadly, yes. QGN 17 lists other names for the same family of tools, including Job Safety and Environment Analysis, Task Hazard Analysis and Safe Job Analysis.

Who should approve a JSA?

QGN 17 says all JSAs need sign-off by a supervisor who knows the job and is trained in JSAs. Where risk scoring is used, it suggests escalating approval with the residual risk, up to the site senior executive for extreme risk.

The post Job Safety Analysis in Mining and Quarrying: A QGN 17 Template appeared first on HazView®.

Managing the heat stress quarry workers face in summer is a planned control, not a matter of telling people to drink more water. A quarry pit traps radiant heat, plant work is physical, and some of the people most exposed are the ones who usually work in an air-conditioned cab and are not used to the heat outside it. In Queensland the law expects the site’s safety and health management system to deal with heat, and one regulation sets specific wet bulb temperatures.

This guide covers why quarries run hot, what the Queensland instruments actually say, the symptoms to watch for, and the parts of a workable heat stress management plan: water, shade, rest, acclimatisation and triggers. It finishes with a pre-summer checklist.

Why heat is a quarry hazard, not a comfort issue

Heat illness is progressive. It starts with cramps, headaches and poor concentration and can end in heat stroke, which is a medical emergency. Safe Work Australia’s working in heat FAQ lists dizziness, sweating, visual disturbances, fainting, nausea and muscle cramps as common symptoms, and says heat-related illness can be life threatening if left untreated.

The less obvious cost is what heat does to judgement. A tired, dehydrated operator makes worse decisions at a tip head, on a bench or when clearing a blocked chute. The Queensland coal guidance note on heat, QGN 32, reports that serious accident frequency rates for Queensland surface mining were about 27 per cent higher in the summer months, October to March, than in winter, using data from July 2017 to June 2021. That figure covers Queensland surface mining operations, not quarries specifically, but the mechanism is the same.

Heat also compounds the other hazards on the quarry hazards and controls list. It drives fatigue, it shortens tempers during contractor handovers, and it makes people cut corners on isolation when the job is in full sun.

Where the heat comes from at a quarry

QGN 32 frames heat load as three things working together: the environment, the work, and the individual. At a quarry each of those has a local shape.

• The pit itself. Faces, benches and the pit floor reflect and re-radiate the sun, and a deep pit gets little breeze. The weather station reading at the office is not the reading on the floor of the pit at two in the afternoon.
• Crushing and screening plant. Steel walkways, stairs and enclosures heat up, and much of the plant work is climbing, shovelling spillage and clearing blockages: hard physical effort in the hottest part of the site.
• Drill and blast on the bench. Outdoor work in direct sun, often with no shade within walking distance and a deadline set by the firing time.
• Maintenance and hot work. Welding, gouging and work on hot engines add process heat to ambient heat, usually in heavier PPE.
• Cab failures. Most operators sit in air-conditioned cabs. QGN 32 treats them as low risk unless that control fails, and notes they may not be acclimatised when their job changes and they are suddenly outdoors for long periods.
• PPE. Long sleeves, hi-vis, respirators for dust and disposable coveralls all reduce the body’s ability to shed heat.

What the Queensland instruments say

Quarries in Queensland are regulated under the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999. Section 39 makes the site senior executive responsible for keeping risk at an acceptable level and for developing and implementing a safety and health management system for everyone at the mine, including contractors. Heat is one of the risks that system has to manage.

The Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017 then has four provisions that touch heat directly.

Section 143: heat

The site senior executive must ensure the mine has a system for managing the risk to persons from heat in places at the mine where the wet bulb temperature exceeds 27°C. The system must provide for setting maximum wet and dry bulb temperature limits for exposure, having regard to the 34°C limit and any criteria in a guideline for managing heat. Separately, a person must not be exposed to a wet bulb temperature exceeding 34°C unless they are doing authorised work to reduce the temperature, are a mines rescue member under documented procedures, or are being evacuated in an emergency. Section 143 sits in the Regulation’s general work environment provisions and applies to every mine under the Act, surface quarries included, not only to underground workings.

Wet bulb temperature is not the air temperature on the forecast. It accounts for humidity, which is why a humid coastal day can be more dangerous than a dry inland one at a higher reading. Do not treat the 27°C wet bulb figure as the point at which heat starts to matter: the general duty to keep risk acceptable applies well before it.

Sections 86 and 90: self-assessment and cool water

Section 86 requires each worker to periodically self-assess their condition, and gives effects of heat strain or fatigue as the example, to decide whether they are fit to work without creating an unacceptable level of risk. Section 90 requires amenities for workers’ fitness and health, including supplies of cool drinking water, within a reasonable distance of each workplace at the mine and kept hygienic.

Section 9: monitoring

Where it is appropriate given the nature and level of a hazard, section 9 requires monitoring to include one or more listed methods, one of which is self-monitoring to detect the hazard’s effects. The Regulation’s own example is self-recognition of physical symptoms of heat stress or fatigue. For heat, that makes symptom training a natural part of how the site monitors the risk.

QGN 32, by analogy only

The most practical Queensland document on heat is QGN 32, Managing exposure to heat in surface coal mines and surface areas of underground coal mines (January 2022), listed on the Queensland register of recognised standards, guidelines and guidance notes. Be clear about its status: it was written for coal mines under the coal Act, it does not apply to quarries, and a guidance note is not mandatory even where it does apply. As at October 2026 the register lists no heat guideline or guidance note written for mineral mines and quarries. We use QGN 32 below because its method transfers well, not because a quarry has to follow it.

Safe Work Australia’s position is also worth knowing. Its working in heat FAQ says there is no single maximum temperature at which work must stop, because one figure cannot account for humidity, air flow, the intensity of the work and whether workers are fit and acclimatised.

Recognising heat illness early

Early recognition is the control that buys time. QGN 32 notes that bravado, or not wanting to be seen as the weak link, leads workers to hide early symptoms. Make it normal to say “I’m cooked” and step out.

• Dehydration: thirst, dry lips and tongue, slowed thinking, reduced or dark urine. Safe Work Australia notes thirst is satisfied before fluid loss is fully replaced.
• Heat cramps and heat rash: painful muscle cramps during demanding work; an itchy rash of small red spots.
• Fainting (heat syncope): often on standing up. Lie the worker flat with legs slightly raised.
• Heat exhaustion: QGN 32 lists heavy sweating, pale skin, weakness, dizziness, headache, nausea, irritability.
• Heat stroke: QGN 32 lists high body temperature (above 40°C), hot dry skin, slurred speech, irrational behaviour and loss of consciousness. Call 000 and start cooling immediately.

QGN 32 describes heat stroke as a medical emergency where treatment in the first 30 minutes is critical, and promotes “cool first, transport second”. Safe Work Australia’s first aid for heat-related illness page says cold water immersion from the neck down is the most effective cooling where practicable. Your quarry emergency response plan should say where the cooling gear is and who uses it.

What a quarry heat stress management plan contains

Safe Work Australia’s heat guidance, including its Guide for managing the risks of working in heat, follows the hierarchy of control, and the examples on its managing risks page translate directly to a pit: cancel or reschedule work when it is too hot, mechanise physical tasks, separate people from hot plant, provide shade and air conditioning, schedule heavy work for cooler parts of the day, and use breathable clothing.

Water and amenities

Section 90 asks for cool water within a reasonable distance of each workplace, which at a quarry means the pit floor, the plant and the bench, not just the crib room. QGN 32 recommends small quantities of water at frequent intervals, every 15 to 20 minutes, rather than large amounts each hour, and suggests urine colour charts in toilets so people can check themselves. Plan who refills the eskies and when.

Shade and rest

Portable shade or an air-conditioned crib hut near the plant and on drill benches does more than any poster. QGN 32 suggests rest periods of at least 15 minutes in shaded and cooled areas to have a greater effect on core body temperature. An air-conditioned vehicle parked nearby counts if it actually works.

Scheduling and pace

Move plant cleanups, liner changes and heavy manual work to early morning. QGN 32 warns that paced work, such as shutdown maintenance or work to a firing time, needs special attention because people cannot slow down when they feel the heat. Rotation and a buddy system shorten each person’s exposure.

Acclimatisation

Safe Work Australia says workers who are not acclimatised, or are returning after a week or more away, are at higher risk, and that acclimatisation should not be relied on as a control because it differs for every person. QGN 32 says acclimatisation can be regained in 2 to 3 days after returning to work in heat. In practice that means lighter outdoor duties for new starters, people back from leave and contractors arriving mid-summer, and for cab operators moved onto ground work.

Triggers and escalation

QGN 32 suggests sites consider a trigger action response plan for heat, including key triggers that say when more controls are needed, an escalation process, and named positions responsible for each action. Its suggested trigger inputs are environmental temperature, humidity and airflow, physical work rate, and acclimatisation status. The specific trigger values are for your site to set from a recognised assessment method; QGN 32 lists several, and none of them is a single stop-work number.

Individual fitness

Medications, pre-existing conditions and a previous heat illness all raise risk. Safe Work Australia flags all three, and QGN 32 lists medications and pre-existing health conditions among its individual factors. Heat also feeds straight into your quarry fatigue management plan: hot nights mean poor sleep and a worse next shift.

Where heat plans fail in practice

• The plan lives in the office. Nobody on the plant knows what the trigger is today or what changes when it is reached.
• Water at the crib room only. A 10-minute walk to water means people skip it.
• Broken cab air conditioning tolerated. A failed cab turns a low-risk operator into a high-risk one, and the defect sits in a queue.
• Small crews, no buddy. Someone working alone clearing a chute in the afternoon has nobody to notice confusion.
• Heat not recorded as a cause. QGN 32 notes historical under-reporting, with heat events often attributed to personal factors. If heat never appears in incident records, the plan never improves.

Pre-summer heat checklist

Keeping the plan visible on the ground

Most heat plans fail on visibility, not content. HazView suits quarries as well as coal mines, and it gives the site one map that every role uses. Shade points, water stations and known hot work areas can be drawn on it as features, so a contractor on day one sees where the nearest cool water is. A pre-shift heat check can be built as a custom checklist that works offline in the pit, with the supervisor entering the conditions from the site’s own forecast or instrument and the TARP level carried in the answer options, so the response is set by the answer. Controls such as a cab air conditioning repair carry an owner, a due date and a status. HazView does not connect to weather stations or heat monitoring equipment; the readings come from your existing sources.

See how it works for workers in the field, or book a HazView demo before summer starts.

Frequently asked questions

Is there a temperature at which quarry work must stop?

Not a single one. Safe Work Australia says no single stop-work temperature can account for humidity, air flow, work intensity and acclimatisation. In Queensland, section 143 of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017 does prohibit exposure above a 34°C wet bulb temperature, with narrow exceptions, but the duty to manage heat applies long before that.

Does QGN 32 apply to quarries?

No. QGN 32 covers surface coal mines and surface areas of underground coal mines, and as a guidance note it is not mandatory. Quarries can use its method as good practice, but their legal obligations come from the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 and Regulation 2017.

How much water should quarry workers drink?

QGN 32 recommends small amounts at frequent intervals, every 15 to 20 minutes, rather than large volumes at once, with cool potable water close to the work. Section 90 of the Regulation requires supplies of cool drinking water within a reasonable distance of each workplace.

Who is most at risk of heat illness at a quarry?

People doing physical work in sun or near hot plant, people in heavy PPE, and anyone not acclimatised: new starters, workers back from a week or more away, visiting contractors, and cab operators moved to ground work. Safe Work Australia also lists younger and older workers, pregnant women and people with conditions such as heart disease.

What should a supervisor do if a worker shows signs of heat stroke?

Call 000, move the worker to a cool place, remove unnecessary clothing and PPE, and start cooling straight away, by cold water immersion if practicable or by wetting, fanning and ice packs. Do not give fluids unless the person is fully conscious. QGN 32 stresses that treatment in the first 30 minutes is critical.

The post Managing Heat Stress at a Quarry This Summer appeared first on HazView®.

A quarry hazard register is the single list of every known hazard at a quarry, recording where each one is, how bad it could be, which controls manage it, who owns those controls and when the entry was last checked. Below is a complete register template you can copy, a guide to every field, and a filled example for two common quarry hazards.

This guide covers what Queensland, New South Wales and Western Australian law actually asks of you, the twelve fields a working register needs, how to keep it current after the risk assessment workshop ends, and the ways registers quietly go stale. It sits within the wider guide to quarry hazards and controls.

Why a quarry hazard register matters

Most quarries have plenty of hazard information, in risk assessment workbooks, inspection forms, toolbox notes, contractor plans and the quarry manager’s head. What they lack is one place where all of it meets, so that a new crack at a face crest, a missing guard on a tail pulley and an overdue berm repair all show up in the same view.

A register is that view. It answers the questions an inspector, an incoming supervisor or a new contractor will ask on day one: what can hurt people here, where is it, what stops it, and is that control actually in place today.

What the law requires, and what it does not

No Australian mining law requires a document called a hazard register, and no regulator prescribes its columns. A register template is a tool, not a legal requirement. What the law does require is a risk management process and records that a register is a practical way to hold together.

Queensland

Under section 27 of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999, risk management is the systematic application of policies, procedures and practices to identify, analyse and assess risk, monitor levels of risk, provide for critical controls, and review the effectiveness of risk control measures. Section 55 requires the safety and health management system to identify critical controls. Those critical control obligations, and the Schedule 2 definitions of a critical control and a material unwanted event, were inserted by the 2024 amendments; what they mean for a quarry is covered in critical controls at a Queensland quarry.

Part 2 of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017 sets out the process itself:

• Section 6 requires the site senior executive to ensure hazard identification is done when operations start, during operations, and when operations change in size, nature, complexity or another way.
• Section 7 requires risk to be analysed to decide whether it is at an acceptable level, having regard to things including the interaction of hazards and the effectiveness and reliability of hazard controls in use.
• Section 8 sets the order of hazard controls: elimination, substitution, separation, engineering controls, administrative controls, then personal protective equipment.
• Section 9 requires risk to be monitored, including the occurrence of incidents, injuries and ill health and the level of hazards in the work environment.
• Section 10 requires a record of a risk management process carried out for a hazard that is present, or likely to be present in proposed operations, naming the people involved and their positions, describing the hazard, the method used to assess likelihood and consequence, and the controls proposed. The record is kept at the mine until the hazard is no longer present.
• Section 11 requires risk monitoring records to be kept for 30 years for a hazard with a cumulative or delayed effect, such as silica, noise or vibration, and 7 years for other hazards.

Section 10’s hazard description, assessment method, controls and people involved are the core of every register row. The Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act and Regulation do not use the term principal hazard; that concept comes from the NSW and WA regulations below. Queensland instead works through material unwanted events, which Schedule 2 of the Act defines as unwanted events whose potential or real consequence exceeds a threshold the operator sets as warranting the highest level of attention, and the critical controls that prevent or mitigate them. For how risk is judged acceptable, see acceptable level of risk at a quarry.

New South Wales

Section 14 of the Work Health and Safety (Mines and Petroleum Sites) Regulation 2022 requires risks to be managed under Part 3.1 of the general WHS Regulations, with risk assessments done by a competent person. The operator or contractor must keep a record of each risk assessment, the name and competency of the person who did it, and the control measures implemented. An operator’s record forms part of the safety management system and the mine’s records.

Section 4 defines a principal hazard as a circumstance with a reasonable potential to result in multiple deaths in a single incident or a series of recurring incidents, in relation to listed hazards that include ground or strata failure, roads or other vehicle operating areas, air quality or dust, and fire or explosion. Sections 27 to 29 require the operator to identify all principal hazards, prepare a principal hazard management plan for each, and review the plan when a control measure in it is revised. A tier-3 quarry (five or fewer full-time equivalent workers, no dredging or blasting, and no more than 30,000m3 extracted a year) is exempt from those plan provisions under section 178, but its safety management system document must still set out the controls for listed hazards such as ground or strata failure and roads or other vehicle operating areas.

Western Australia

The Work Health and Safety (Mines) Regulations 2022 follow the same pattern. Regulation 617 requires risks at a mine to be managed under Part 3.1, with risk assessments by a competent assessor. Regulation 612 defines a principal mining hazard by the same multiple-fatality test, and regulations 627 to 629 require the mine operator to identify each one, prepare a principal mining hazard management plan and review it. The quarry detail is in principal mining hazards at a WA quarry.

The quarry hazard register template: every field explained

These twelve fields are enough to run a quarry register without turning it into a second risk assessment.

Use your own site risk matrix for the inherent risk field rather than inventing one for the register. If you do not have one, the method and matrix are set out in the quarry risk assessment template.

Blank register

Copy this header row into a spreadsheet or your own system. One row per hazard.

A filled example: two quarry hazards

The two rows below are shown field by field so they read on a phone. They are illustrations only.

Notice what the second row is doing. The register is not only a list of standing hazards; it also carries the short-lived ones that inspections find, with a due date that makes the overdue guard visible to everyone, not just the person who found it. The face checks behind the first row are set out in the quarry face inspection checklist, and the stability side in quarry batter stability.

Keeping the register alive

Most registers are accurate on the day of the workshop and drift from then on. Keep one live by tying it to things that already happen.

• Feed it from inspections. Any inspection finding that is not closed on the spot becomes a register row, or updates an existing one, with an owner and a due date.
• Update it on change. A new bench, a relocated crusher, a new contractor or a new product is a change in operations. In Queensland, section 6 already requires hazard identification when operations change.
• Update it after incidents. Every incident or high potential incident should be checked against the register: was the hazard listed, and did its controls work?
• Bring contractors into it. Contract crushing and drill and blast crews bring hazards of their own. Their hazards belong in the quarry’s register, linked to their plans, as covered in contractor management at a quarry.
• Review it on a fixed rhythm. Walk the open rows at the weekly production meeting and the full register at a set interval. The review date column proves you did.
• Use it in the system review. The register is one of the first things to test when checking whether your safety and health management system works, the subject of QGN 38 and reviewing a quarry SHMS.

Where hazard registers go wrong

• It is a copy of the risk assessment. Hundreds of rows, nothing about status, and no one can find the five things that matter this week.
• Locations are words. “Near the crusher” sends two people to two places. Without a map reference, nobody can see that three open hazards sit on the same haul road bend.
• Status is never updated. Rows marked open since last year, rows marked closed with no evidence, and no date showing when either happened.
• Owners are departments. When an action belongs to “maintenance”, it waits until somebody happens to notice.
• It is not connected to inspections. The register says a control exists; the inspection form that would prove it sits in a different folder and never mentions the hazard ID.
• Only one person can edit it. If the register lives in one spreadsheet on one laptop, it is only as current as that person’s last free afternoon.

A register tied to the site map

The spreadsheet problem is not the columns. It is that the register is separate from where the hazards are and from the inspections that check them, so keeping it current depends on someone retyping what the field already knows.

HazView suits quarries as well as open cut coal and metalliferous mines, and it is built the other way round. Hazards are drawn, updated and resolved on one interactive map of the site that every role uses, each with its type, status, photos, properties and full history. The register is a full table of every hazard and map feature on site, each hazard is drawn on the site map, and the register exports with one click to CSV or JSON. Controls are recorded against each hazard with an accountable owner, due date and status (Compliant, Non-Compliant or Ongoing). Checklists can be attached to a specific hazard, so the inspection that checks a control lives on the same record, and they work offline at the face and sync when back in reception. See how this works for quarry and mine managers using HazView, or book a demo to see a register built on your own site map.

Frequently asked questions

Is a quarry hazard register a legal requirement?

Not by that name. Queensland, NSW and WA law require hazard identification, risk assessment, controls and records of them, and principal hazard management plans in NSW and principal mining hazard management plans in WA. A register is a practical way to hold those records together, but no regulator prescribes its format.

What is the difference between a hazard register and a quarry risk register?

The terms are often used interchangeably. Where a site keeps both, the risk register usually holds the assessed risk scenarios from workshops, and the hazard register holds the physical, located hazards and their current control status. The template above combines both in one row per hazard.

How often should a hazard register be reviewed?

The legislation does not set a frequency for a register. Open items are commonly reviewed weekly, the full register at a set interval, and any entry whenever operations change, an incident occurs or an inspection finds a control not working.

How long must hazard records be kept in Queensland?

Under section 10 of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017, a risk management record is kept at the mine until the hazard is no longer present. Under section 11, risk monitoring records are kept for 30 years for hazards with a cumulative or delayed effect, such as silica or noise, and 7 years for other hazards.

The post Quarry Hazard Register: Template, Fields and Keeping It Alive appeared first on HazView®.