Emergency Preparedness for Small Mines and Quarries

Cover image for a guide to emergency preparedness for small mines and quarries

Emergency preparedness at a small operation is a different problem to emergency preparedness at a large one, and QGN 15 is the Queensland guidance note that recognises that. It is written for small mines and quarries: the operations without a standing rescue team, a full time emergency coordinator or a helipad, where the first ten minutes are handled by whoever is on site.

It is also the clearest emergency preparedness checklist the inspectorate publishes, which makes it worth reading regardless of how large your operation is. This guide covers what it asks for and where preparedness usually breaks down.

The problem QGN 15 addresses

Large operations have depth. Someone is trained, someone is rostered, the equipment is checked by a person whose job that is, and the emergency response plan is exercised because there is a function that owns exercising it.

A small operation has none of that structure and exactly the same hazards. The pit is still deep, the plant still has stored energy, the roads are still shared with heavy vehicles, and the nearest ambulance is still an hour away and does not know where the site entrance is. The consequence of an event is often worse at a small operation, not better, because the response depends entirely on the people who are already there.

QGN 15 responds to that by being concrete. It is a list of things that need to exist, be current, and be findable.

What the guidance note covers

The structure runs through purpose and scope, legislative obligations and risk management, and then a substantial section on emergency preparedness itself covering:

  • The emergency response plan itself.
  • Mine information. The details an external responder needs and does not have.
  • Plans and drawings. Current site plans usable by someone who has never been here.
  • Risk management. The credible emergency scenarios this operation actually faces.
  • Emergency equipment and facilities.
  • First aid supplies, with an example kit contents list in the appendices.
  • Training.
  • Incident control. Who runs the response.
  • Communication.
  • Contact lists.
  • Securing the site.
  • Additional procedures.
  • Records.

An appendix covers the Emergency Management Queensland rescue helicopter, which is the item most likely to be skimmed and most likely to matter. A remote operation that has not worked out where a helicopter can land, and how to describe that location to someone flying towards it, has a gap it will discover at the worst possible time.

Mine information and plans, for people who do not know the site

Two of the sections deal with what external responders need, and this is where preparedness most often fails in a way nobody notices during an exercise.

The people who arrive have never been on your site. They need the physical address that a navigation system will find, which is frequently not the postal address. They need the gate, and whether it is locked. They need to know the site is a mine, what is stored on it, and what could hurt them. They need a plan they can read at speed, in poor light, showing access roads, the muster point, the location of the emergency equipment and where the incident is.

A site plan drawn for mining purposes is usually the wrong document for this. It shows what a mining engineer needs and omits what a paramedic needs. Preparing a second, simpler plan aimed at responders is a small piece of work with a disproportionate payoff.

And it has to be current. Access changes constantly on an operating site. A road closed by a dozer this week is a dead end for an ambulance.

Incident control at small scale

Incident control is about who is running the response, and the small site version is harder rather than easier. The named coordinator may be on leave, off site, or be the person involved in the incident.

The workable answer is a role that is always filled rather than a person who is usually available: whoever is the senior person on site holds incident control until relieved, with the succession defined in advance. Everyone needs to know how control is claimed and handed over, because the failure mode at small operations is not the wrong decision, it is three people each assuming another person is coordinating.

The same logic applies to accounting for people. A site of twelve people is easy to account for right up until visitors, contractors and a delivery driver are on site and nobody has a list.

Contact lists, communication and securing the site

Contact lists get their own section because they decay faster than any other part of an emergency plan. People change roles, numbers change, contractors change. A list reviewed annually is on average six months out of date at the moment it is needed.

Communication is the other reliable weak point, particularly in a pit. Mobile coverage that works at the office is not coverage at the bottom of a cut, and radio channels that work between operators may not reach an office that has closed for the day. The test is not whether communication exists, it is whether a person alone at the far end of the site at 5pm can raise someone.

Securing the site is the section people forget entirely. After a serious incident the scene may not be disturbed except to make it safe or to help an injured person, and there are notification obligations that run in parallel. Getting that wrong in the confusion is common and consequential. The reporting duties are covered in high potential incident reporting in Queensland and, on the WA side, in notifiable and reportable incidents at WA mines.

Records

QGN 15 finishes on records, and the reason is not administrative. Three record sets decide whether preparedness is real.

  • Equipment checks. Extinguishers, first aid kits, eyewash, stretchers, defibrillators and spill kits, each with a date and a person. Emergency equipment that has never been checked is decoration.
  • Training and exercise records. Who is trained in what, when it expires, and what the last exercise found. An exercise that generates no findings was not a test.
  • The response record itself. What happened, when, what was decided and by whom, which becomes the basis of the investigation and the notification.

Where sites come unstuck

  • The plan is written for the auditor. Comprehensive, unusable in an emergency, and never opened by anyone in a hurry.
  • It has never been exercised. Small operations skip exercises because everyone is busy, and an unexercised plan is a document rather than a capability.
  • Access information is stale. Gate codes, road closures and muster points that changed and were never updated.
  • Equipment checks are not recorded. Someone checks the first aid kit occasionally and there is no way to know when.
  • Contractors and visitors are outside the plan. Not on the muster list, not inducted into what to do, and present on site.
  • One person holds it all. The person who knows how everything works is the single point of failure, and emergencies do not wait for them to be rostered on.

Keeping preparedness current instead of documented

Emergency preparedness is almost entirely a currency problem. Every element decays: contacts, access, equipment, training, plans. The document does not decay, which is precisely why relying on the document is dangerous.

HazView helps with the parts that live on the ground. Emergency equipment is registered where it physically is, so an extinguisher or first aid station has a location and its own inspection history rather than a line on a list. Checks are scheduled and assigned, and overdue ones are visible instead of being found during an audit. Muster points, access routes and current closures sit on the same map everyone already uses for hazards, so the emergency picture is the live picture rather than a plan printed last year.

Because it runs on a phone or tablet and works offline, a person at the far end of the site can record what they are looking at, with photographs and a position, and that record exists whether or not there is coverage at the time. Offline capability on a remote site is covered in offline hazard mapping when reception fails.

The REST API keeps the perishable data honest. Contact lists, personnel and contractor records usually live in systems that are already maintained, and pulling from those beats retyping a list that then quietly ages. Records can go back out to corporate systems the same way.

None of this responds to an emergency. People do that, and the plan and the training are what make them effective. What a system can do is make sure the equipment was checked, the plan reflects today’s site, and the record of what happened exists afterwards.

See how HazView works for everyone on site, or book a demo.

Frequently asked questions

What is QGN 15?

The Queensland guidance note on emergency preparedness for small mines and quarries. It covers the emergency response plan, mine information, plans and drawings, risk management, equipment and facilities, first aid, training, incident control, communication, contact lists, securing the site, additional procedures and records. It is guidance, not law.

Does a small quarry need an emergency response plan?

Yes. The obligation to manage risk does not scale down with the size of the operation, and the consequence of an event is often worse at a small site because the response depends on the people already there.

How often should the plan be exercised?

Frequently enough that people can act without reading it, and often enough to catch decay in contacts, access and equipment. A short, focused exercise on one scenario several times a year is more useful than one full scale exercise that is postponed.

What do emergency services need from us?

A findable address and gate, knowledge that the site is a mine and what is stored on it, a simple current plan showing access, muster point and equipment, someone to meet them, and for remote sites a known helicopter landing area they can be directed to.

Who runs the response at a small site?

Define it as a role rather than a person. The senior person on site holds incident control until relieved, with succession set out in advance, so control is never waiting on someone who is off site or involved in the incident.

Can we disturb the scene after a serious incident?

Only so far as is needed to make the situation safe or to help an injured person. Beyond that the site is to be secured, and notification obligations run in parallel. Deciding this in the moment is how it gets wrong, so it belongs in the plan.